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ABSTRACT 
The ability to predict the likelihood of conflict between two states based primarily on 
extrinsic factors is an arduous task, particularly given the complicated nature of analysis 
required and the large number of input factors involved. However, the benefits that may 
be gained from such an evaluation could reveal valuable insights for a decision-maker if 
seemingly small factors exhibit a large impact on a state’s prospect or ability to take 
action. A software model can be used to address the problem of aggregating and 
analyzing the information available to make a graphical model that facilitates quantitative 
analysis between different factors that are linked together. This thesis will look 
specifically at the elevating tensions between Israel and Iran with such a model to 
estimate whether the known factors can lend information to forecast the prospect of 
action by Israel as the two nations reach thresholds for combat. Specifically, this work 
will account for factors that would likely be present and perhaps predictive of Israel 
making a preemptive strike on Iran. The objective will be to create a product that can be 
used by an intelligence analyst as a briefing tool and to gauge its effectiveness as 
potential decision-making aid for commanders. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In today’s age, nearly every country in the world is influenced by conflict that 
befalls two nation states. Whether the ramifications are merely far-removed economic 
effects or as impactful as direct action resulting in the loss of lives, there is 
unquestionably a range of consequences that may ensue as an outcome of hostilities. That 
said, the likelihood of those consequences increases greatly as a country is more tied into 
the affairs of the world, both politically and economically. Those effects are further 
increased given the reality that many countries are obligated to come to the collective 
defense of other nations under a host of treaty agreements in place today. This fact alone 
will likely ensure that dominant nations keep a watchful eye on budding disputes between 
states around the world. With that in mind, the ability to forecast conflict is invaluable in 
a state’s strategic decision-making, posturing, and planning. 
As one looks at the process of predicting the likelihood of conflict occurring, the 
process is rife with potential impediments stemming from the multitude of input factors 
involved, not to mention the complicated nature of the analysis. Any evaluation process 
would be an arduous one, with that difficulty amplified by the unfortunate fact that 
analysts may only have open-source or extrinsic information at their disposal to work the 
problem. In looking at factors that get fed into such a decision-making process, especially 
when related to the use of force, a challenging problem set is created in attempting to 
both aggregate the mass of data and to provide a relatively simple process for evaluation. 
This is especially onerous when most of the input variables are based on qualitative 
factors to look at how each may come together to influence the effects on a wholly 
inclusive outcome. 
In the case of discord between two specific states, there must be elements present 
that drive one or both of the respective governments to take action. Assumed as 
fundamentally rational actors, history tells us time and again that particular factors are 
repeatedly present on the road to war. In taking preemptive actions, generally a number 
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of preconditions are first met, which one may be able to gauge and enumerate as 
precursors leading up to action. The problem is that, while these factors can be identified 
and analyzed, there is difficulty in bringing the data together and organizing those factors 
in an explicable manner such that one can draw a reasonable conclusion regarding the 
overall status of the potential conflict. For example, if a small regional alliance changes, 
how does this impact the overall statement that a state is more or less likely to take action 
when compared to all other factors? This problem can be dealt with using software that 
aggregates the different factors and links them together in a Bayesian-based influence net. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis will focus on using a computer model to assess and aggregate the 
factors that will likely be present in a conflict between two states to forecast how those 
factors (and changes in those elements) may impact the likelihood of one state taking 
action against the other. The work will look specifically at the conflict between Israel and 
Iran and the dynamics involved in their dealings to envisage the likelihood that Israel will 
conduct a preemptive strike on Iran. 
The model will utilize the Situational Influence Assessment Module (SIAM) 
modeling software to enable the creation of a graphical model to facilitate analysis of 
various factors and to allow a quantitative analysis between the dynamic elements 
involved. The aim will be to isolate individual indicators that may collectively impact a 
state’s decision to take action and to tie each of those indicators together to show the 
causal relationship by which one factor may change the overall likelihood that action will 
be taken. By enumerating individual factors and assessing each as it may impact the 
entire model, an influence net can be formed that results in a holistic product capable of 
yielding a simplistic output to a relatively complex problem set. The advantage to this 
approach is that once the model is created, a military intelligence analyst can make 
changes to individual nodes, and can concentrate on the accuracy and validity of the 
individual nodal statement, without worry as to how that one change will impact the 
overall complex system.  
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The potential benefit of modeling conflict in this manner is an output that allows 
decision-makers another tool to estimate the impact of changes among multiple causal 
factors to judge the status of the impending conflict. This information can be used as a 
situational awareness tool or factors can be altered based on potential courses of action 
and excursions can be run within the model to see how different factors may affect the 
overall situation. Those runs of the model can potentially be used to support strategy 
towards avoiding conflict (if that is the goal) by way of controlling nodes through policy 
decisions and other influence factors that our forces are capable of impacting. In looking 
at the Israel-Iran conflict specifically, there is also a benefit to the European Command 
(EUCOM) Information Operations Cell, whose leadership has expressed interest in a 
modeling product as a tool in assessing the current state of affairs and how changes may 
affect the current enmities. While the product produced may be a framework for 
modeling conflict in general, the near-term objective is to produce a model that provides 
a simplistic input and a single output to provide a snapshot based on those inputs and to 
allow for excursions to provide possible chains of events that may occur based on what-if 
scenarios posed by a Combatant Command (COCOM) staff. 
C. BRIEF EXPLANATION OF METHODOLOGY 
In creating a SIAM model of this type, there are three main phases of 
development that will be completed before running the program and any excursions. The 
first is the creation of the general model architecture, starting with the root statement that 
is being assessed. In this case, the root statement is: Israel will execute a preemptive 
strike on Iran. From there, different nodes will branch off to support or inhibit the root 
strength as will be outlined in Chapter II. The key method for devising the nodes that 
feed into the model will stem from case studies and literature on historical factors present 
in earlier conflicts. Primarily, those factors will look at fighting that has erupted in the 
Middle East over the past fifty or so years and conditions present in any Israeli wars. 
Additionally, literature on why nations go to war and decision that led others to avoid it 
will be referenced to build a list of questions that may be asked in reference to the current 
strife between Israel and Iran for their applicability.  
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The second phase will involve looking at the links between the nodes to assign 
strengths between the statements. This portion essentially involved taking qualitative 
factors and assigning them quantitative values to influence the net that is built. The 
primary source for assigning these values will be with reference to the same literature 
used to come up with the nodes, but also by consulting subject-matter experts (SME) that 
are familiar with both the countries involved and the current conflict. Assigning link 
strengths is really what comprises up the meat of the model and will be somewhat of a 
subjective process. That said, the general consensus on those factors will be used to 
generate the Causal Strengths (CAST) Logic for SIAM and will ultimately lead to the 
output based on initial inputs. 
The final phase will involve answering the initial nodes for the model. These will 
be true or false statements, and although most may be answerable with open-source 
research, these statements may also require SME input. Ideally, intelligence analysts 
working for the COCOM, who are able to inject the model with more accurate 
information from a wider range of collective intelligence and classified information at 
their disposal, will eventually provide this input. Once this is complete, a few excursions 
will be done based on possible link strength scenarios and assessments will be performed 
to see what the key pressure points are in impacting the likelihood of a strike.  
D. THESIS STRUCTURE 
Six chapters and three Appendices compose this thesis. Chapter I is an 
introduction and outlines the problem statement and objective of the work done. Chapter 
II, taken largely from Rosen and Smith, includes a background of the SIAM modeling 
software to include the basics of the model structure and the outputs available from the 
completed model. Chapter III discusses the methodology used for research, specifically 
the resources used for assigning values to the link strengths within the model. Chapter IV 
displays the top two levels of the Iran-Israel model including nodal analysis for runs of 
the model based on likely scenarios. Chapter V includes assessments of the model once 
complete with built-in SIAM analysis tools to isolate key factors within the model for 
decision-making. Chapter VI includes conclusions based on the model, suggestions for its 
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use and employment in potentially guiding policy decisions, and recommendations for 
future applications and research involving computer-based models of this type. Appendix 
A includes the initial node questions that must be answered to run the model. Appendix B 
includes the entire link strengths matrix used between nodes in the model from top to 
bottom. Appendix C includes the visual depiction of the model for an overall general 
sense of how different factors are connected and to show lower level factors that were not 
addressed in either Chapter IV or the list of initial nodes in Appendix A. 
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An influence net is a graphical model that depicts a group of events and the causal 
relationships between them to assess how they relate and influence one another. The 
technique of constructing such a model combines two established methods of decision 
analysis: Bayesian inference net analysis typically employed by the statisticians and 
influence diagramming techniques used by operations researchers. 1 
A. SIAM 
SIAM is a robust software tool designed specifically for the creation of influence 
nets. The program facilitates this process with a simplified graphical user interface for 
easily organizing a complex set of factors and linking together statements that impact 
each other. Networks created in SIAM can then be used to identify important issues, 
actions, or factors that can and do influence a specific outcome in the model.2 SIAM uses 
Bayesian probability techniques among the links to assess the relationship factors once 
the model is constructed, which yields a probabilistic vice deterministic result. As 
different factors are changed in the model, the overall outcome changes, which allows for 
decision-makers to wargame scenarios. This allows them to not only determine the 
possible outcomes of a course of action (COA), but also unintended consequences that 
reverberate throughout the net with seemingly small changes that are made. While 
traditional wargaming involves an adversarial element of a staff, or a Red Cell, to assess 
possible actions and reactions, a SIAM influence net provides a different type of 
wargaming in that link strengths within the model will generally be vetted through 
subject matter experts (SMEs) for the particular scenario as opposed to a staff that may 
lack expertise and may not be able to consult the experts with each iteration of a possible 
COA. 
                                                
1 Julie A. Rosen and Wayne L. Smith, “Influence Net Modeling with Causal Strengths: An 
Evolutionary Approach,” Proceedings of the 1996 Command and Control Research and Technology 
Symposium (Monterey: 1996), accessed 17 December 2012, 
http://www.inet.saic.com/docs/_docs_/math.pdf.  
2 Bradd C. Hayes and Jeffrey I. Sands, “Understanding and Using SIAM,” Naval War College, 
accessed 17 December 2012, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/modeling/usesiam.doc. 
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In building a SIAM model, a root statement is made and then causal nodes are 
connected to the root statement that have the most immediate overarching effect on the 
possibility of that root statement being true or false (Figure 1). From that point forward, 
additional nodes are added down the model and the number of influencing factors 
increases as is needed to assess the problem and to adequately address each node above 
it. 
 
Figure 1.  Graphical Representation of the Root Level of the Model. 
B. SIAM NODES 
The most basic element in the influence net is the node, which can be an event or 
idea that influences the issue. Each node is placed into the model on a level in relation to 
another node and connected by a link (described in Chapter II, Section C). The problem 
to be evaluated is called the root node and is referred to as the top level, or Level 1 of the 
model. The connected nodes are either parent nodes, which are causes, or child nodes, 
which are effects, all of which sit below the root node. At the lowest level of the model 
are initial nodes. These are the only nodes where the user enters data once the model is 
constructed and they should be basic true or false statements. Those parent nodes 
influence all of the nodes above them up to the root statement. It is important to note that 
the nodes in the middle levels of the model serve as both parent and child nodes. For 
example, a level three node in a four level model may have three initial nodes feeding 
into it and it also may be one of two feeding into a level two node. Thus, it is the child for 
the level four nodes feeding it and a parent feeding into level two. The Iran-Israel model 
has four primary levels of nodes that lead up to the root. 
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When a node is built, it is a sub-statement that is ultimately an assertion that 
would directly affect the node above it. Thus, the node is populated with a description 
and comments to ensure the user populating the initial node knows exactly what is being 
assessed. If it is the initial node, the user will also use a slider bar to classify his or her 
belief that the nodal statement is true or false (Figure 2). This will then trickle up to 
impact the slider bars automatically on all the levels between the initial node and the root 
depending on the link strengths between the created nodes. 
  
Figure 2.  Node Property Window with Belief Value Slider. 
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C. SIAM LINKS 
The other fundamental elements in the model are the links that join nodes. These 
links effectively make up the inner logic of the model and are used to describe the causal 
relationship between two statements. Once the nodes are made, they are appropriately 
linked together and link properties are filled in as needed (Figure 3). The cause node is 
the parent and it is the premise for the link slider bars. The child node slider indicates the 
effect that the parent will have on it, depending on whether the statement is true or false. 
If the premise for the statement is considered true, the slider bar is adjusted to represent 
an estimate of how that would impact the likelihood of the child node being impacted. 
The same assessment is done to address the impact if the statement is false. In judging 
where the slider bar should fall, this is the key phase where a qualitative assessment is 
turned into a quantitative measurement to the software to feed into the model. 
As slider bars are adjusted, nodes are termed as reinforcing or reversing. A 
reinforcing node describes a situation where, if the parent node is true, it will reinforce 
the child node. If a parent node is true and makes the conclusion less likely, the impact is 
a reversing one. Identifying nodes that have the most influence as far as reinforcing or 
reversing are vital to a decision-making process. They can isolate small causes that may 
end up creating large effects on the overall problem and that information can be 
leveraged in identifying priority intelligence requirements, in different planning phases, 
and in the wargaming process. 
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Figure 3.  Link Properties and Premise Slider Bars. 
D. SIAM BASICS 
Once nodes are built and linked together, the model is ready to be run. Baseline 
beliefs need to be assigned for all of the initial nodes based on SME input for the initial 
run, which should be done in the initial build of the model based on conditions at that 
time. The SIAM program uses color to demonstrate the belief strength of each node. The 
colors are green and red, and the range in shades indicates how true or false, respectively, 
that the likelihood of each statement is. Both colors shade to gray as likelihoods approach 
an assessment that is less known. Thus, a statement with an extremely high likelihood 
would be bright green, and one that is calculated to be extremely false would be a bright 
red color. These colors are generated through the influence net propagation algorithm, 
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which is based completely on CAST logic (discussed below). Once a belief to the initial 
nodes changes, the statements can be adjusted as needed and the model can be run again. 
It is important to note that the model is not temporal in any way. It does not track changes 
to account for any of the statistical calculations nor does it have any kind of a built-in 
history. This precludes trend analysis unless the data is transferred outside of the model 
and also means that for the model to be accurate, the assumptions needs to be kept 
current. 
E. CAUSAL STRENGTH LOGIC 
It is worth presenting a short background on causal strength logic to have an 
understanding of how the internal calculations are done within the model. While the 
statistics are relatively straightforward, the examples demonstrate how the chain of 
probabilistic nodes can get very complicated as the chained statements grow. Below is an 
explanation of the CAST logic. As stated, the model is based on Bayesian statistics. 
Bayesian statistical methods provide a paradigm for both statistical inference and 
decision-making under uncertain conditions. Bayesian statistics use the word probability 
in precisely the same sense in which this word is used in everyday language, as a 
conditional measure of uncertainty associated with the occurrence of a particular event—
given the available information and the accepted assumptions. Thus, Pr(A|B) is a measure 
of belief in the occurrence of the event A under conditions B. 
 
Figure 4.  Pairwise Influence Example.3 
If Figure 4 were to represent two statements in an influence net and we were to 
follow the statement that if A were to occur, then B will result, then a third measure 
                                                
3 Rosen and Smith, “Influence Net Modeling,” 5. 
 13 
should also be present to represent the strength of causality between A and B. This is 
denoted as h, which can be considered the probability of an event Z, where A and Z fully 
determine B.4 For example, consider a case where event Z is the result of a flipped coin. 
If the coin lands heads up (h = 1), then it is certain that the occurrence of event A will 
result in event B; if the coin lands tails up (h = 0), then A’s occurrence has no effect on 
event B.5 Again, this cause-effect relationship assumes that there are no other events that 
can occur or influence this pair so, by itself, event A implies/causes event B’s 
occurrence.6 We must also account for the effect that the non-occurrence of influencing 
events may have on the outcome. That is to say, what is the chance that event B will 
occur anyway if A does not? To continue the coin flip analogy, consider a second coin 
flip, say event W, whose likelihood, denoted g, determines the probability of event B; if g 
= 1, then the absence of event A is certain to produce event B’s occurrence; if g = 0, then 
event A’s non-occurrence has no effect on the outcome of B.7  
To look at this practically, we can turn to an example model involving a historical 
SIAM model dealing with the Iraqi incursion into Kuwaiti territory. Particularly, the 
influencing parameters around Iraqi leadership’s decision to consider a peaceful 
withdrawal can be evaluated to better understand these causality arguments. Assuming 
pairwise causality in Figure 5, the truth in the statement “Hussein believes U.S. has 
resolved to liberate Kuwait” is assessed to cause the event “Saddam decides to withdraw 
from Kuwait peacefully” with a strength of h = 0.9. The numerical value given to h (on a 
minus one to plus one scale) indicates the assessment made by the modeler that there is a 
very high causal strength that, if Hussein believes the U.S. has the resolve to liberate 
Kuwait, he will very likely decide to withdraw. Conversely, if Hussein does not believe 
in the United States’ resolve, then the causality value has a lesser strength of g = −0.1. 
The minus value here indicates that it is an inhibiting statement if the statement is false. 






That is to say that if Hussein does not believe in the U.S. resolve, then not only is he less 
likely to withdraw, but he is reinforced in his likelihood to keep forces in country.  
 
Figure 5.  Iraq Model Example CAST Parameters.8 
The illustration in Figure 5 introduces two more concepts to the CAST logic 
construct, those being negative causal strengths for a true statement and baseline 
probabilities. When one states that an influence inhibits the occurrence of an event, the 
implication is that the likelihood of the effect occurring is inversely affected by the 
presence of that respective influence.9 In the example of Figure 5, if the parent node 
(withdrawal would be politically costly for Saddam’s regime) were true, then Saddam’s 
decision to withdraw peacefully is unlikely to occur; specifically at a strength of h = 
−0.8.10 It is important to note that if Hussein did not believe that withdrawal would be 
costly, then he still might consider withdrawal, but at a strength level of g = 0.3. Taken 
together, these two strength values imply that the overall influence of the political cost of 
withdrawal would inhibit Saddam’s decision to withdraw from Kuwait.11 Along with 
inhibiting events, the idea of a baseline probability is also seen with Figure 5. After 
                                                





identifying the cause-effect event pairs, the modeler assigns pairwise causal strengths to 
indicate the influence of the parent event by itself on the child event.12 The cumulative 
effect of the modeled influences is calculated for each affected event in the Influence Net. 
However, unidentified influences must also be included. To account for these 
unidentified influences, the baseline probability of an event is the user-assigned 
assessment that the event would occur independent of the modeled influences in the 
net.13 For example, all knowledge of the situation not explicitly included implies that the 
likelihood that Saddam will decide to withdraw from Kuwait is 30% (b = 0.3). Figure 6 
depicts how the baseline is set with bx as the baseline value to the statement.  
 
Figure 6.  Baseline Probability Example.14 
For this depiction, we assume that the two parent events denoted Y and Z, 
respectively, are assumed to be true. Therefore, we consider their true causal strengths on 
the child event X (Saddam decides to withdraw from Kuwait peacefully).15 In this figure, 
the true causal strengths are denoted as hX|Y and hX|Z, respectively. The event X has a 






baseline probability of 0.3, so there is a 70% belief that Saddam will not decide to 
withdraw from Kuwait.16 That is, ignoring the influences Y and Z, there are about 3 
chances in 10 that Saddam will withdraw peacefully.17 When considering the influence of 
event Y on X, the true causal strength hX|Y = 0.9 implies that the likelihood of X is 
increased by 90% of the remaining uncertainty (recall that the causal strength assumes an 
influence of Y on X, by itself, and therefore should not be considered a conditional 
probability).18 On the other hand, event Z’s true causal strength on event X is negative, 
hX|Z = −0.8. That is, if Saddam believed withdrawal would be politically costly, then the 
likelihood of his decision to withdraw peacefully would decrease by 80%.19 These same 
types of calculations would be performed if the parent events were false with the values 
representing whatever respective values were assigned. In the false causal strength 
calculations, the user-assigned strengths gX|Y and gX|Z would replace the corresponding h 
values.20 These calculations are summarized as follows: If Y is true, bX|Y = bX + hX|Y (1 - 
bX) for hX|Y ≥ 0 and bX|Y = bX - hX|Y * bX) for hX|Y < 0. If Y is false, bX|Y = bX + gX|Y (1 - bX) 
for gX|Y ≥ 0 and bX|Y = bX - gX|Y * bX) for gX|Y < 0.21 To explain this concept in terms of the 
traditional probabilities, consider bX|Y to be the conditional probability that outside 
influences will cause X or that Y (by itself) will cause X (again assume event Y is true).22 
The outside influences cause X with a value of 0.3. By itself, Y will cause X with strength 
of +0.9. This is analogous to flipping two coins, the first landing heads with a probability 
0.3 and the second landing heads with probability 0.9. That said, the probability that 
either coin lands heads equals 0.93.23 
                                                
16 Ibid. 









Figure 7.  Kuwait-Iraq Model Example.24 
1. Causal Strengths Algorithm 
The preceding discussion considered the impact of pairs of events with cause and 
effect characteristics. However, real-world situations would take into account the 
cumulative effects of multiple causes on a single event. Figure 7, taken from the example 
model, depicts multiple parents feeding into one child to look at the possible cases that 
could result. Each box is assigned a letter to differentiate the nodes. For the child node X, 
there are 6 parent influences. Therefore there are 26 = 64 conditioning cases as follows: 
Case 1: {X | Y, Z, A, B, C, D}, Case 2:{ X | ¬Y, Z, A, B, C, D}, Case 3:{ X | Y, ¬Z, A, 
B, C, D}, … Case 26: { X | ¬Y, ¬Z, ¬A, ¬B, ¬C, ¬D}.25 Once the cases are identified, 
there are only a few steps remaining as a part of the CAST algorithm. Once these steps 
are completed, the traditional probability calculations are performed to derive the 
cumulative likelihood of any event included in the influence net. First, we must aggregate 
positive causal strengths and aggregate negative causal strengths and then combine 
them.26 Then, conditional probabilities must be derived for each. To simplify the notation 
used to further describe the math in this process, let Ci denote the causal strength of the ith 
                                                
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 8. 
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parent event in the conditioning case of interest.27 For example, in Case 2 above: C1 
=gX|Y =−0.1, C2 =hX|Z =−0.8, C3 =hX|A =−0.7, C4 =hX|B =−0.95, C5 =hX|C =+0.4, C6 =hX|D 
=−0.9. 
To aggregate positive causal strength, we combine the set of causal strengths with 
positive values for each of the 2n conditioning cases associated with the selected child 
event. These positive causal strengths are aggregated using the combination rule in the 
following equation: C+ =1−  (1−Ci) over all Ci ≥ 0.28 This expression follows from the 
assumptions of independence of the pairwise cause-effect relationships. In other words, 
the complement of the aggregate positive causal influence C+ (i.e., 1 − C+) is the increase 
in the probability that the child event will not occur unless (at least) one of the multiple 
independent influences cause the event to occur.29 For example in Case 2, above: C+ = 1 
− (1 − 0.4) = 0.4.30 To aggregate negative causal strengths, a similar process is done. We 
combine the set of causal strengths with negative values for each of the 2n conditioning 
cases associated with the selected child event. These negative causal strengths are 
aggregated using the following combination rule: C− = 1 − (1 - | Ci|) over all Ci < 0.31 
The interpretation for this rule is that the complement of the aggregate negative causal 
influence C− (that is to say 1 − C−) is the increase in the probability that the child event 
will occur unless (at least) one of the multiple independent influences cause the event not 
to occur.32 For example in Case 2, above: C− =1 − (1 − 0.1)(1 − 0.8)(1 − 0.7)(1 − 0.95)(1 
− 0.9) = 0.99973. Finally, the positive and negative causal strengths must be combined to 
yield the ultimate effect of each strength. This is done with a cancellation axiom where 
we let (1 − C+) denote the potential of a child’s occurrence being promoted due to a set of 
parents, and let (1 − C−) denote the potential of a child’s occurrence being inhibited by a 
set of parents.33 Then, there is an overall influence, O, that represents the net influence of 
                                                
27 Ibid. 






the set of parents.34 The overall influence is given by the ratio of the aggregated 
promoting and inhibiting influences. Heuristically, this axiom asserts that the 
accumulated influence of all parents (specified in the conditioning case) is partitioned 
into: a portion that balances out the opposing side; and the remaining overall influence.35 
From the form of this axiom, we now introduce the following expressions for 
calculating the overall influence on the child event, O: If C+ ≥C−, then we solve for O (≥ 
0) with (1 − C+) = (1 − O) * (1 – C−).36 If C+ < C−, then we solve for O (< 0) with the 
equation (1 − C−) = (1 − |O|) * (1 − C+).37 Thus, using Case 2 above as we have with 
prior examples, C− > C+, and thus the second equation would be using to yield (1 − 
0.99973) = (1 − 0.4) * (1 – |O|), which implies O = −4.5 × 10−4. Recall that this procedure 
is employed for each of the 2n conditioning cases associated with the respective selected 
child event. 
In the final step to the CAST algorithm, we need to derive conditional 
probabilities. Specifically, the overall influence, O, is used to update the baseline 
probability of each child event in the matrix. The updated value then can be inserted into 
the transition matrix to yield the required values. Consider the jth conditioning case and 
let Oj denote the overall influence on the child event from the jth set of parent states. Then 
the conditional probability of the child, given the jth set of parent states is given by the 
equation: P[child | jth set of parent states] = bchild + (1 − bchild) * Oj for Oj ≥ 0 and bchild − 
bchild * Oj for Oj < 0.38 Again for Case 2 above, we have the following entry for the 
corresponding element of the transition matrix: P [X | ¬Y, Z, A, B, C, D] = 0.3 − 0.3 * 
(−4.5 * 10−4) = 0.300135. 
Once the transition matrix is completed through the use of equation to derive 
conditional probabilities on each of the 2n parent states, then the traditional law of total 
                                                                                                                                            
33 Ibid. 
34 Rosen and Smith, “Influence Net Modeling,” 8. 
35 Ibid. 




probability ( ) can be employed to determine the current estimate for the 
likelihood of the child event.39 Specifically, P[X]= ∑j=1,…,2n P[X | jth set of parent states] 
* P[ jth set of parent states].40 Again, the typical analyst investigating a crisis will not 
have the resources to complete the joint probability matrix for real world situations and 
therefore, a sufficient approximation is to assume the parents are independent.41 In Case 
2 above, the joint probability, P [jth set of parent states], on the right side of the previous 
equation is calculated as the product: P[¬Y, Z, A, B, C, D] = P[¬Y] P[ Z] P[A] P[B] P[C] 
P[D].42 
Thus, with the expert-assigned understanding of the situation as it existed in early 
1990, the probability that Saddam decides to withdraw from Kuwait peacefully is less 
than 0.1.43 Thus it was assessed that the combined influences on Hussein did not serve to 
convince him to leave Kuwait peacefully. This type of product can be used in formulating 
plans given the fact that force will likely be required if the factors in the model hold true. 
This probabilistic math is applied to all nodes in the model as a means of getting a final 
percentage of likelihood that any root statement is true or false. 
F. BENEFITS OF SIAM ANALYSIS 
The benefit of SIAM for a model of this type hinges on the fact that as the model 
grows, it would otherwise be infeasible to track the effects of a small change on the entire 
model without exhaustively repeating statistical calculations each time. Another key 
value in such software is that both the inputs and the outputs are relatively simple to enter 
and assess once the model is constructed. At the lowest level nodes, an analyst will 
merely have to answer true or false questions without regard for the impact of those 
statements, which adds to ease of use. At the top level, the output is just as clear for a 
decision-maker with a single number output with regard to the likelihood that the 







statement is true or false. In the case of the Israel-Iran model, the more green the root 
node is, the higher the likelihood is that Israel will conduct a preemptive attack and the 
opposite goes for if it is red. 
Once the initial model is run, a leader can also ask what-if type questions and 
excursions can be run to allow for analysis based on different courses of action or 
variations in link strengths. The software also has tools that generate driving parent 
analysis and pressure parent analysis. These will provide information that highlights the 
nodes with the greatest relative impact (driving parent) and those that are most sensitive 
in promoting or inhibiting parent nodes (pressure parent). These tools take into account 
the entire model and overlapping changes given the hundreds of possible outcomes in 
generating this information. This affords the decision-maker information up front to make 
decisions without even running sets of belief evaluations. Finally, there is a pressure 
point analysis tool that identifies the initial notes that have the greatest potential to 
increase or decrease the likelihood of occurrence of a specific event, which can be 
leveraged to provide immediate changes to one path in particular. 
It is important to note that the product generated should not be a substitute for 
judgment. It is a valuable software tool for assessing the overall status of a situation 
based on complex inputs and relationships and for analyzing alternatives in action, but at 
the end of the day it should only be one of many inputs in deciding policy and courses of 
action. 
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The primary means for establishing nodes in the model will be through a 
comprehensive review of literature dealing with both Iran and Israel. This will include 
current events and historical conflicts between Israel and other nations since the root 
statement deals solely with the Israeli side of initiating a strike. A secondary assessment 
of sources detailing factors surrounding state conflict in general (not specific to the 
region or countries involved) will also be conducted. If similar factors are present in 
multiple instances leading to conflict repeatedly, they are worth assessing as possibilities 
that would also antagonize a country like Israel, even if they had not specifically faced 
those problems in the past. The more generalized the literature is, however, the less 
weighted the node or consideration will be as the links are made. 
A. ASSUMPTIONS 
In the approaching the creation of the model, a few key assumptions must be 
taken into account for the model to operate properly. Particularly, one must assume that 
both Iran and Israel will act as rational actors. This means that neither country will carry 
out actions that are deliberately against their self-interest (as they would perceive it). 
While bold actions are sometimes carried out during wartime, which may seem 
unreasonable or irrational given in extremis situations, the likelihood of irrational actions 
as a first move in a planned preemptive strike is highly unlikely. Furthermore, and more 
importantly, if either party was assumed as an unfounded actor, the CAST logic that links 
each node would be irrelevant as there is simply no way to predict what an irrational state 
would do. The model can only act on statistical probabilities and those must stem from 
logical chains of reason, making this assumption a condition precedent to any type of 
conflict-related model. Aside from assuming rational actors on both sides, this model also 
assumes the scope to be a limited-war situation. The model is intended only to look at 
first-strike factors surrounding the development of a nuclear Iran and a kinetic response. 
It is not intended to address acts short of war such as espionage, cyber munitions, or 
covert action against either state, but it will take the assessment of some of those actions 
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into account when looking at first-strike likelihood. Finally, with regard to capability 
assessments, the same factors apply. Israeli attack is not assumed to imply that any type 
of occupation or control of Iran will take place as a result of a strike so only capabilities 
required for that type of action will be assessed.  
B. LINK ANALYSIS AND ANALYST INPUT 
The methods for link analysis will be largely accomplished using the same type of 
research done to create nodes and assess factors leading to conflict. Characterizing link 
strengths will be done with more emphasis on public avowals made by both state 
representatives and the subsequent SME analysis of those statements. As the situation is a 
dynamic one, information passed on from Israeli leadership will play a large part in 
judging how the CAST logic should be configured initially. This logic can be changed 
once the initial build of the influence net is complete but since the model is a snapshot in 
time under circumstances, using those sources is appropriate. While classic triggers to 
conflict may be present, much can be inferred from the tone and words used by those in 
power who have decision-making powers or influence on those in power. If multiple 
SME sources agree on the tone that one speech or proclamation takes, then it will assist 
in judging the worthiness of inferences made. As much of the information fed into the 
model will be judged qualitatively, these statements will be vital in constructing the 
model. 
The initial nodes will be set with baseline values using the same methods 
mentioned above, but they will ideally be sourced out to intelligence analysts for current 
belief settings. The root nodes are broken up into nuclear, domestic, international, 
regional, and provocation nodes as are described further in Chapter IV. Thus, area experts 
can provide inputs for each second-level node based on their respective area of expertise. 
One of the analysts can also be trained to tweak CAST logic as needed. In this initial 
build, only open-source intelligence (OSINT) will be used and thus some nodes may be 
missing from a final product that would be fielded to a command like the EUCOM 
Information Operations (IO) Cell. 
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IV. ISRAEL-IRAN MODEL CONSTRUCT 
The premise of the model and all supporting nodes is to determine the strength of 
the root node statement, that Israel will conduct a preemptive strike on Iran as a result of 
increased tensions surrounding the development of their nuclear program. As different 
factors feed into the prospect that the root is true or false, the subject can be broken down 
into categorical areas to parse out different distinct themes among the nodes. These 
categories were derived primarily from common sense reasoning that factors feeding into 
the decision-making cycle would stem from what will be termed soft and hard factors. 
The hard factors are those that would force the hand of the Israelis to take action 
and demand a response. For example, if Iran tested a nuclear weapon and then made a 
public statement that they were going to use all of their capabilities to attack Israel, these 
would fall into the hard category as Israel would have almost no option other than to 
respond with some force. For this model, the two hard categories are the nuclear and 
provocation level two nodes. The nuclear node will deal directly with nuclear production 
activities. The provocation parent node will deal with non-nuclear factors that may spark 
a strike nonetheless. For example, Iran may have zero nuclear weapons capability but 
may make statements declaring that they are planning a first strike. This type of language 
would still feed into the decision cycle that prompts a strike before Iran gains the ability 
to use a bigger hammer in their plans. Israel may use the nuclear development as the 
excuse to carry out an operation with the provocative language as a compounding factor 
that is the proverbial straw that breaks the camel’s back.  
The soft factors are those that may not directly spark a strike, but will 
undoubtedly feed into the timing and the ultimate decision to use force. The three soft 
categories are domestic, regional, and international level two nodes. If internal factors 
would preclude a strike because of public opinion, military equipment shortfalls, or 
economic factors, those ideas will be represented in the domestic nodes. Also, regional 
instability may result from a strike and official backing by one country for or against 
Israel with a prospective strike will be inevitably drive the type of mission that is 
planned. These factors will be represented under the regional node. Finally, international 
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influence, particularly from the United States (U.S.) given the alliance between the U.S. 
will be accounted for under the international node. All initial nodes in the levels below 
that will feed into one of those main categories. 
The primary drivers to the conflict are with Iran’s perceived initiative to produce 
nuclear weapons. Iran and Israel have long been enemies and Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad has made frequent calls for Israel to be “wiped off the map” in several 
instances over the past decade.44 Thus, the development of any weapons that could 
provide increased capability to fulfill their anti-Zionist aspirations significantly escalates 
the tensions with Israel as they worry about self-preservation and the stability of the 
region. While Iran outfitting itself with conventional capable of destroying Israel would 
not necessarily be grounds for action alone, Israeli is able to justify plans for a potential 
strike on the premise that Iran may be moving toward the production of a nuclear 
weapon. While this is not known definitively, Israel has the United Nations (U.N.) to 
back them in their efforts to stop potential production, as Iran is a signatory of the U.N. 
treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT). With the treaty in place, 
certain safeguards, to include inspections, are mandated to ensure that a country does not 
move towards the development of nuclear weapons. Recently, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) expressed serious concern regarding the continued enrichment 
and heavy water-related activities in Iran, along with blocked access to certain nuclear 
sites.45 With no assurances that Iranian nuclear activities are solely being used for 
scientific ventures and continued hostile rhetoric, Israel finds itself at a point where the 
aforementioned hard and soft factors need to be assessed to account for a decision on the 
subject of action. The statements that feed into the nodes, link weights, and baseline 
beliefs towards making a model around an Israeli decision to strike are discussed below. 
                                                
44 Safa Haeri. “Iran on Course for a Showdown.” Asia Times Online, 28 October, 2005, accessed 22 
December 2012, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GJ28Ak03.html. 
45 International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and 
relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report GOV/2012/37 
(Vienna, Austria: IAEA, August 2012). 
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A. NUCLEAR 
The level three nodes and link strength that feed into the level two statement “Iran 
has a nuclear weapons capability” are listed below in Table 146. Nodes feeding into level 
three are listed in Appendix A. The heart of the issue surrounding the conflict between 
Israel and Iran is centered on Iran’s nuclear program. It is likely that nodes feeding from 
level two to the root node will be the most impactful as they fall in the hard category that 
was described supra. 
Table 1.   Nuclear Level Three Nodes and Link Strengths. 
                                                
46 The impact levels listed in the table are indicators of where the slider bars that were described in 
Figure 3 of Chapter II will be positioned in the link strengths. For example, if premise statement 1.1 is true, 
the impact to the conclusions statement on level two statement is 90% in the direction of the more likely 
(promoting) side. If it is false, the slider bar is 80% in the direction of the less likely (inhibiting) side. If 
zero for either true or false is set, it indicates that there would be no impact on the child node if the 
respective statement belief is made. The numbers listed are also the exact probabilities that will be used in 
the statistical calculations done by the model as outlined in Chapter II CAST logic explanation. 
Ref # Nuclear Level Three Node Impact to Level 
Two if True 
Impact to Level 
Two if False 






1.2 Iran is able to enrich weapons-grade 
enriched uranium 
Promotes (+0.3) Inhibits (-0.6) 
1.3 Israel assesses Iran as having 





1.4 Iran obtains materials to build a 
nuclear weapons 
Promotes (+0.7) Inhibits (-0.2) 






1.6 Other indicators of Iran’s nuclear 





1.7 IAEA concludes with certainty that 
in-country nuclear work is for 
entirely peaceful purposes as 




1.8 Iran possesses a used reactor fuel 
reprocessing capability 
Promotes (+0.7) No impact 
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1. Iran Demonstrates Nuclear Weapons Capability / Crosses Red Line 
If Iran is to be assessed as having a nuclear weapons capability, several factors 
need to be overtly present to conclude that Iran is on a clear path to weapons production. 
Alternatively, a set of pop-up actions could take place from covert activity that is 
discovered that immediately alerts the world that they have the capability if development 
of weapons had been successful and only discovered on short-notice. The most obvious 
indicator of a clear capability within this sublevel is a weapons test or demonstration 
(#1.5). If a nuclear bomb is tested, this will have the strongest promoting potential for the 
idea that Iran possesses a nuclear weapons capability. Even if the test is small or a fizzle, 
it is likely that any such test will be perceived as a strong indicator of Iran’s intentions 
and capabilities in the near future. In the absence of a test, however, this is no guarantee 
that Iran does not possess a weapon so it would only slightly inhibit the conclusion 
statement. While one may say no testing should lead to no impact, prudence dictates that 
Iran would test any weapon before use, which is why the slight (-0.1) inhibiting potential 
is present.  
Although Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has never explicitly stated that he will 
make a strike given a certain point of production or testing, in recent speeches, he has 
expressly stated that the only peaceful way to prevent Iran from getting atomic weapons 
is to set a red line that they should not pass in their production.47 This implied that if they 
did, in fact, pass the line, that a non-peaceful method of stopping the country would 
become necessary to ensure the country’s security. Using that supposition in the model 
(#1.3), if Iran passes the red line or overtly tests a weapon (which would mean the red 
line was already passed), then the impact will be strongly promoting to both the statement 
that Iran has a nuclear weapons capability and to the root statement on whether or not a 
strike will occur. If Israel sets red line criteria, then it is likely that Iran must cross that 
line for a strike to occur under any circumstances. Ergo, if that line is not crossed, then 
there is a strong inhibiting impact to the statement that Israel believes Iran has a nuclear 
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capability. However, just because Iran does not test complete a demonstration of their 
capabilities as mentioned before, it does not necessarily mean that they do not have the 
capability and thus the inhibiting potential is still a factor for this statement. The idea here 
is that these few factors that will have a strong impact on the notion that Israel believes 
Iran has a weapon, however, a strike may still come about even if those stronger driving 
factors are not present, especially given the subjective nature of a red line. The inhibiting 
potential based on those factors is adjusted to assess for such a variance.  
2. Iran Obtains Material to Build a Nuclear Weapon 
Four nodes stem from factors involving the material required for a bomb. One if 
that Iran has weapons-grade enriched uranium (#1.1), one states that they are able to 
enrich weapons-grade uranium (#1.2) and a third involves the ability to reprocess used 
reactor fuel to obtain plutonium (#1.8). One final consideration is the more general 
statement that Iran obtains materials to build a nuclear weapon (#1.4). This distinction of 
the first statement from the fourth is that the latter involves specifically non-nuclear 
materials needed for a bomb (e.g., internal components or materials to construct a 
delivery vehicle). 
To address statement #1.2, a short discussion on uranium enrichment is of value 
to understand why the task of monitoring is so complicated for the IAEA and how this 
statement plays into the overall statement that Iran has a nuclear weapons capability. 
Along with plutonium, high-enriched uranium (HEU) is one of two materials that can be 
used as the explosive material in nuclear weapons. Uranium itself is used widely for 
civilian application for fuel in nuclear reactors, biological science, and in the medical 
community. Thus, the mining and processing of uranium is not an indicator of illicit 
activity in any modern country. The enrichment process increases the concentration of 
the uranium-235 isotope, which fissions far more readily than the more common 
uranium-238 isotope.48 Uranium-235 is also the type used as fuel in power reactors so its 
enrichment in mass quantities is justifiable. Natural uranium is only 0.7% uranium-235 so 
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the enrichment process needs to occur to yield fuel used for these civilian applications on 
a large scale.49  The fuel required for the reactors needs to only be low-enriched uranium 
(LEU) to 3.5%, however, Iran enriches up to 20% for use with research reactors.50 The 
amount of enrichment required for weapons-grade uranium is 90%.51 While it is assumed 
that Iran has not yet enriched any uranium to weapons-grade, the amount of 3.5% LEU 
and 20% HEU can be used in conjunction with the number of known centrifuges to 
estimate how long it would take Iran to enrich to weapons-grade with the current 
facilities. It’s estimated that with the amount of LEU and separative work units (SWU), 
the time needed to convert this LEU to one bomb’s worth of finished uranium metal 
enriched to 90% U-235 would be three to twelve months.52 If the reactor-grade 
20% uranium were further enriched, it would be done in about six months. If the 
centrifuges were quadrupled, this timeline goes down to 1.6 months.5354 Thus, given that 
Iran has the ability to enrich to 20% already, it is known that they have the capability to 
enrich to higher levels if they desire to do so, and it becomes a question of how quickly 
they can get the amount of material needed. Additionally, one might contend that if Iran 
already has the ability to enrich, that perhaps they have already begun to do so in a covert 
facility. This is where the differences between #1.1 and #1.2 lay. There is currently no 
reason for Iran to have uranium enriched to 90%, and thus, the presence of material 
enriched to that level is a strong promoting statement to their overall capabilities as a 
weapons producer. However, just the mere ability to enrich at all still promotes to some 
degree with the idea that they could be doing it covertly. This may become even more 
complicated in the future as Iran further develops and builds their naval fleet. Iran is 
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currently looking to build nuclear submarines, of which the reactors require a higher-
enriched level than the 20% used in normal power plants. U.S. nuclear submarines use 
uranium that is enriched to 90% however it is assessed that 90% enrichment is not 
necessarily needed for a nuclear submarine. It is estimated that uranium will undoubtedly 
be enriched to levels of 50-60% if they move forward with the development of these 
vessels.55 However, even if they decided to enrich to a higher level, they would still be 
able to do so under the NPT as the venture is strictly for scientific use in designing a 
reactor for use on one of their naval vessels. This would terribly complicate the job of the 
IAEA and ability of other world powers to fully know the intentions of the Iranians. At 
that point, shaping the uranium into a core shape would be the next sign that the HEU 
they possessed was in fact, for a weapon.  
The third factor listed involves the reprocessing of used reactor fuel. Iran’s 
construction of a nuclear reactor moderated by heavy water has also been a source of 
proliferation concern. This is because the reactor’s spent fuel will contain plutonium, 
which is well suited for use in nuclear weapons. To be used in nuclear weapons, however, 
plutonium must be separated from the spent fuel—a procedure called reprocessing. Iran 
has said that it will not engage in reprocessing, and there is no public evidence that Iran 
either has constructed or is constructing a reprocessing facility.56 Thus, the presence of 
such a facility would be a strong factor towards having the capability to produce a 
weapon (+0.7) since there would not be many other reasons towards reprocessing 
plutonium. That said, if a reprocessing facility is not built, it does not necessarily impact 
the likelihood of a capability since it is not needed for a bomb if there is weapons-grade 
uranium available. As a result, there is no impact to statement #1.8 being false. 
The last general statement concerning materiel used (#1.4) involves a delivery 
capability and other internal components. Assuming Iran wanted to build their bomb in a 
manner similar to other countries, the safing, arming, fuzing, firing (SAFF) process 
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requires a number of specialized components to design the triggers and arming 
mechanisms used in the use of such weapons. While the design or development of these 
devices does not indicate a capability per se (as getting the fuel is the most difficult task), 
knowing that the devices are potentially in production promotes to the overall capability 
of the state as far as their ability to complete a full weapon. However, since these 
precautions aren’t necessarily required for a bomb, the absence of such devices also does 
not have a significant inhibiting potential. 
3. Other Factors Present to Indicate a Nuclear Weapons Capability 
Other factors involved in assessing a nuclear weapons capability involve the 
storage and procedures involved with such weapons (#1.6). If facilities suspected of 
nuclear weapons storage are established, changes in military doctrine or procedures are 
made to account for special nuclear weapons handling capability, or if any type of 
nuclear command is set up, these factors will play into the overall readiness of the regime 
as they attempt to become a nuclear state. Thus, the presence of these promotes their 
capabilities and likely would not come until the final stages of production. While one 
may take the stance that since these factors won’t occur until a completed weapon is in its 
final phases that the promoting potential should be very large, it’s likely that the stronger 
links involving the possession of weapons-grade uranium will also be positive at this 
stage and the combined links will make have the intended effect. The mere planning for a 
weapon eventually is not an actual sign of capability though which is why it only has a 
slightly promoting potential in this model. The same factors account for the relatively low 
inhibiting potential if they are not true. 
4. IAEA Reports on Iranian Nuclear Facilities 
Currently there are provisions in place for the inspection of all Iranian nuclear 
facilities by the IAEA to ensure Iranian programs are for peaceful purposes. These 
stemmed from resolutions of the U.N. Security Council and the Board of Directors for the 
IAEA frequently reports on the status of both inspection efforts and the nuclear program. 
As of September 2012, they issued a statement stressing serious concern that Iran 
continues to defy requirements and obligations contained in the relevant IAEA Board of 
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Governors and U.N. Security Council Resolutions, including the continuing and 
expanding uranium enrichment activities in Iran, as reported in GOV/2012/37, in 
particular at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plan.57 Thus, without current access, there is no 
way to validate the activities taking place in Iranian facilities, and if the IAEA cannot 
make a definitive statement about those activities, illicit activity can be assumed to some 
degree. This is why there is a promoting potential to #1.7 being false. If the IAEA were to 
gain access to all facilities and make a declaration that all activities were in line with NPT 
provisions and inspection requirements though, this would be a strong inhibiting 
statement to the statement that Iran has a nuclear weapons capability. While they may 
still be making developments covertly, it would be very difficult to enrich and move the 
uranium required from already known facilities for the amount of materials required. 
Furthermore, if Iran appears to be in compliance with all international requirements, it 
would be very difficult for Israel to claim Iran has a nuclear capability without any overt 
evidence or statements from Iran contradicting IAEA reports.  
B. DOMESTIC 
Aside from Iranian nuclear capabilities, the domestic state of Israel is an 
exceedingly central consideration to any type of move towards an attack on Iran. The 
stance of Israel’s decision-makers, the opinion of the public at large, and of course the 
question of whether Israel is even capable of a strike are all vital in estimating Israeli 
actions. For example, even if Iran has an overt nuclear weapons capability, but does not 
possess a way to bring a strike to Iran because of limitations on military equipment, then 
their desire to strike still makes a strike nearly impossible without support from other 
countries (addressed in other sections below). Those points relating directly to Israeli 
domestic considerations are addressed in this section.  
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Ref # Domestic Level Three 
Node 
Impact to Level 
Two if True 
Impact to Level 
Two if False 
2.1 Economic conditions 











2.3 Terrorism attacks have 
been committed against 
Israel 
Promotes (+0.5) No Impact 
2.4 Public opinion supports an 
attack on Iran 
Promotes (+0.5) Inhibits (-0.5) 
2.5 Israel has the military 
readiness required for a 
strike 
No impact Strongly 
Inhibits (-0.9) 
2.6 Current Israeli government 





Table 2.    Domestic Level Three Nodes and Link Strengths. 
1. Economic Condition 
In just 32 days of war with Lebanon in 2006, the cost of the conflict on the Israeli 
economy was a combined 1.8 % with a 0.5 % reduction in economic growth and another 
1.3 % in direct costs and damages.58 Taking figures from past conflicts and looking 
towards the estimated requirements for a conflict with Iran, a full-scale conflict could 
cost as much as 167 billion shekels ($42 billion) over a period of five years.59 Direct 
immediate costs would be 47 billion shekels ($12 billion), which would be equivalent to 
over five percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product from last year.60 Although a 
five-percent drop in GDP does not qualify as a depression from an economical standpoint 
(most would define it as a drop in real GDP of ten percent or more), if those numbers 
were revised and it was assessed as higher and closer to that limit, the assessment could 
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considerably change the courses of action.61 Inevitably, a strike on Iran may lead to a 
longer-term kinetic conflict that will require activation of reserve Israeli forces and a shift 
towards a wartime economy. If it is assessed that the impact of a conflict on the economy 
will be devastating to the populace, this will inhibit the statement that Israel can support a 
war from the strictly domestic standpoint. However, the inhibiting potential will not be as 
significant as it could be if Israel believes their existence in jeopardy and thus may lead to 
a strike, which is why the inhibiting value is not as high as some other factors (-0.4). If 
the current defense budget is assessed as adequate for the conflict, then this will promote 
the statement from an economic standpoint. Justification for different values between the 
node being true and false are due to the fact that not having the defense funds would be 
more devastating to the courses of action available than if economic conditions were 
satisfactory. Furthermore, given  the availability of funds or a favorable assessment of the 
impact on the Israeli economy (favorable in that it would not be crippling), that fact alone 
would not necessarily drive Israel towards calling the state capable of supporting war 
when compared to some of the other reference points. Thus, the impacts are scaled down 
to account for just how impactful nodes concerning military readiness and government 
support will be in comparison. 
2. Military Readiness 
The ability for Israel to actually conduct a strike on Iran is a vital factor in crafting 
any course of action (#2.5). Simply put, if Israel does not have the organic capability to 
conduct a strike, they will need to either develop those capabilities or garner support from 
allies to provide what is needed in a coordinated attack. Parents to this node will also take 
into account the ability to defend against a counterattack as a weighted factor and the 
types of munitions available as Iranian facilities are hardened. Defense Minister Barak 
noted that both military capability and the ability to withstand a counterattack as factors 
that would require an affirmative response before a decision is made to attack.62 If the 
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overall statement is true, however, the mere capability does not necessarily indicate 
domestic support or that an attack will happen.  
Since the readiness assessment is somewhat subjective, the opinions of Israeli 
government officials and analysts that are experts on the subject will be the primary 
feeders into this node. In open source assessments mainly in non-Israeli media, analysts 
currently assert that although the Israel Air Force (IAF) is formidable, an attempt to 
destroy Iran’s nuclear capability would be a challenge due to both the IAF’s technical 
capabilities and the limited numbers of aircraft in its fleet that are equipped to 
simultaneously operate over long ranges, carry the necessary ordnance, and thwart 
foreign air defenses.63 Further assertions from experts like former Central Intelligence 
Agency and National Security Agency Director Michael Hayden have also noted 
potential deficiencies in capability with Hayden saying that airstrikes capable of seriously 
setting back Iran’s nuclear program were beyond the capacity of Israel as of early 2012.64 
While no one outside of the Israeli government knows the full capability of the 
Israeli military, there have also been independent assessments made that state very 
diametric opinions about both current capabilities and what is needed for a strike to be 
effective. For example, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 
made a case that an effective strike would actually require much less air power than some 
have predicted, and they claim that Israel already has what they need to perform an 
effective strike.65 If this were true, the mere capability to strike, however, does not 
necessarily indicate domestic support. Thus, domestic support would be affected 
negatively if this statement were false because no reasonable person would support a 
strike doomed to fail, which is why the node being false carries such an impactful 
inhibiting weight. If readiness supports a strike, however, it does not mean that domestic 
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support will increase merely because the option is available though, which is why there is 
no impact to the statement being true. 
3. Government Support 
According to one report, the issue of a possible Israeli strike on Iran has sparked 
fierce public debate in Israel among political and military leaders, past and present, 
dividing cabinet ministers, generals and Mossad chiefs.66 Most see military action as a 
last resort to be contemplated only if sanctions and diplomacy fail; others insist that 
bombing Iran could actually stabilize the Middle East by setting back the radical cause 
indefinitely.”67 The view of government officials, particularly those in crucial 
government decision-making positions, will be key in the verdict to make a strike. The 
parent nodes feeding into #2.6 will be broken down to represent the views, of the Prime 
Minister, the National Security Cabinet, the President of Israel, and the Knesset. 
Additionally, consideration will be taken for input from the Israeli Defense Force 
Leadership and Israel’s intelligence organization, the Mossad, to feed into those views of 
the Prime Minister. 
Israeli law requires that major national-security decisions, like signing peace 
accords or ordering airstrikes, must receive a majority vote in either the full cabinet or a 
smaller ministerial committee on national security—a panel comprising half the ministers 
of the 30 member cabinet.68 However, it is largely held that eight cabinet members, 
called the octet, hold the power to sway the entire cabinet.69 Another factor that will 
affect the internal decision-making in Netanyahu’s cabinet is the opinion of the country’s 
military and intelligence leaders. Giora Eiland, a national-security adviser to former 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, has stated that the opinion of General Benny Gantz, the IDF 
chief of staff, carries significant influence within the government decision-making 
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process.70 While the government can make any decision, and the professional military is 
subordinate to the political decision, it would be unwise if the chief of staff were against 
the decision, as he would have to carry out the orders. In public testimony, Gantz made it 
clear that he believes Israel has a right to strike at Iran’s nuclear program.71 Behind the 
scenes, however, some Israeli observers, such as Ha’aretz’s defense correspondent Amir 
Oren, have written that Gantz does not favor an attack.72 Another voice of opposition 
comes from the former chief of Mossad, Meir Dagan, who is likely the architect of 
Israel’s covert war against Iranian nuclear scientists and sensitive installations.73 In 
public interviews, his language was very strong, even to go far enough to call it the 
“stupidest idea” he had ever heard.74 While he is not the current intelligence chief, his 
insider knowledge of the situation still carries some weight and it can be inferred that the 
current Chief is privy to the same information that Dagan based his opinions on. As 
parent nodes to the Knesset, the Prime Minister, and the cabinet, the views of both the 
chief of staff and the Mossad chief will both have strong promoting or inhibiting 
potentials based on their assessments of the capabilities and threats against Israel. 
While a few of those feeding into Prime Minister’s decision-making cycle may 
have opinions for or against action, ultimately the decision to strike (with the support of 
the cabinet) will be that of Netayahu and his Defense Minister. They both carry 
significant weight within the cabinet, and currently, it is assessed that the majority of the 
cabinet support the views of their decision advocating a strike.75 Furthermore, history has 
shown that a few determined people at the top are able to bring others along. According 
to a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, it was the case in 1981 
with Osirak in Iraq and in 2007, with Syria.76 Barak and Netanyahu should not be 
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underestimated in their ability to bring others in the cabinet and the defense establishment 
around to support their views.77 Thus, the prime minister will carry the largest weight in 
statement #2.6 with the Security Cabinet following as the prime factors in determining 
government support. 
4. Public Opinion 
The responsiveness of government decision-making based on the perceived 
preferences of the citizens in any state is a central concern of various normative and 
empirical theories of democracy.78 This is no different in Israel where the question of the 
public’s influence on the Knesset and the Prime Minister must be taken into account for 
as the country decides whether or not to strike (#2.4). However, different leaders within 
the Israeli government feel differently about how the weight of public opinion should 
shape the decisions being made within the political arena. For example, Defense Minister 
Barak feels that the public debate over fateful decisions ought to be limited, while Yossi 
Sarid, a former politician, minister, and Knesset member, holds that the public must not 
be excluded from the preliminary debate about such decisions.79 While it is difficult to 
make statements regarding the causality between public opinion and the ensuing 
decisions of leaders, there is some history in Israel to suggest that the public may have 
some impact. With the 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon and with the 2005 withdrawal 
from the Gaza Strip, there seemed to be a disparity between public opinion and the stance 
of Israeli leadership; in both cases, the leaders ended up making decisions in line with the 
public.80 With both of these major policy decisions, there is some evidence that public 
opinion played a role. Thus, while it may affect different leaders in different ways, #2.4 
should have a promoting or inhibiting effect on the overall domestic support of action. 
While the weight of public opinion will feed into the overall statement that Israel 
supports a strike domestically, it is interesting to note that many nodes will likely feed 
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into the public opinion piece. For example, a terrorist attack (#2.3) would likely spark 
outrage amongst civilians and create support for action as would a stark change in the 
economic conditions of the country (#2.1). Recent polls indicated that Israelis put 
economic factors (involving socioeconomic gaps) a much higher priority than military 
readiness.81 Other factors, such as American support, will also be parents to this node. 
Public opinion polls conducted in early 2012 indicated reluctance by a majority of 
Israelis to support an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in the absence of U.S. 
cooperation.82 Assuming an Israeli attack without U.S. cooperation, a poll conducted 
jointly by Israeli and Palestinian organizations in 2012 indicated that Israelis would 
oppose a strike by a 51%–42% margin; a sizeable majority, however, would apparently 
support an attack with U.S. cooperation by a 69%–26% margin.83 An Israeli political 
science professor involved with another poll on the same questions reportedly explained 
the Israeli views as follows: “They are not challenging the right to [attack], [they are] 
challenging the ability to do it effectively and with international support. People don’t 
want Israel to become the troublemaker of the world.”84 While the influence on the 
overall Israeli opinion will be fed by many sources, it seems that if history is any 
indicator, those sentiments will likely have some influence on the overall decision-
making process within the Israeli government and may play into whether a preemptive 
strike is in the best interest of the people who will ultimately be forced to fight. 
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While nuclear and domestic issues deal directly with the two states involved and 
their actions on either side, international considerations will weigh heavily into any 
considerations to strike by the part of Israel. With public opinion within Israel being tied 
directly to United States backing, and ultimately, some causality presumed between 
public opinion and the course Israeli leaders will take, a number of these nodes will be 
tied to both domestic and regional factors. Additionally, if worldviews sway 
overwhelmingly in one direction or the other in favor or against a strike, Israel may heed 
to the pressures of those bodies. The international nodes deal directly with both specific 
organizations and the intervention or support of key countries on the international stage. 
They do not take into account regional factors, as those will be addressed in the next 
section. 
 
Ref # International Level Three 
Node 
Impact to Level 
Two if True 
Impact to Level 
Two if False 
3.1 International community 
formally supports an Israeli-
led strike against Iran 
Promotes (+0.4) Slightly 
Inhibits (-0.2) 
3.2 U.N. demonstrates the ability 
to deter Iranian Aggression 
towards Israel through non-
kinetic means 
Inhibits (-0.6) Promotes 
(+0.4) 
3.3 U.S. supports Israel with 
capabilities negating the 
need for immediate action 
Inhibits (-0.4) Slightly 
Promotes 
(+0.2) 
3.4 United States Supports a 
Preemptive Strike 
Promotes (+0.6) Inhibits (-0.4) 
3.5 Overall U.S. support for 
Israel declines 
Inhibits (-0.3) No Impact 
Table 3.   International Level Three Nodes and Link Strengths. 
5. International Organizations Voice Support for Israel 
Support from international organizations would likely have a promoting effect on 
Israel’s likelihood of taking action. With the backing of an organization like the U.N., 
Israel would have justification in taking action and there would be an assumed backing 
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from U.N. forces if it reached that point. With that kind of support and some confidence 
that they would be protected from a counterattack by Iran from international forces, they 
would certainly be more likely to strike if the capability and triggers were there. If an 
organization like the U.N. voiced support in favor of action by Israel, this would likely be 
tied to other links in the model as well with regard to support from Israel’s leaders and 
the public opinion of the Israeli people at large. However, the backing of the international 
community is certainly not needed for action. In 1981, for example, the U.N. Security 
Council (including the United States) voted unanimously in favor of Resolution 487, 
which condemned Israel’s strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor as a violation of the U.N. 
Charter and the “norms of international conduct.”85 Israel likely knew there would be a 
backlash from the organization, however, they chose to take action anyway. Thus, this is 
why #3.1 only shows a slight inhibiting impact if they lacked the support. 
6. United Nations Demonstrates Ability to Deter Iranian Aggression 
Israeli officials and analysts generally agree that a strike would not completely 
destroy the Iranian nuclear program. According to multiple news sources, a successful 
strike would inflict significant enough damage to delay production of a weapon three to 
five years.86 That, of course, would be if Iran chose to continue production after a strike, 
knowing the potential for another future strike may be a factor. However, knowing that 
the initial strike may only delay production vice completely destroying the program, it’s 
worth considering the implications if other options may lead to that same end-state. If the 
U.N. sanctions are assessed as successful or if specific actions are taken that makes it so 
difficult that Iran’s production would be delayed for years through non-kinetic actions 
like those, such regulations by the international community could be an ideal alternative 
to a risky air strike. Thus, if this capability were true, this would be a strong inhibiting 
node for the international community’s support for a strike (#3.2). If sanctions are 
assessed as not working, it is assumed that the international community would also 
concur with their ineffectiveness. Thus it would be a promoting factor because one could 
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say that all other options had failed at that point with military action being the next 
logical step. The fact that sanctions are in place at all would likely result in the perception 
of favorable international views for Israel whether they were working or not though 
which also contributes to the level that it would promote if false. 
7. United States Provides Additional Capabilities to Israel 
The overall success rate for the current Israeli Iron Dome missile defense system 
has been described by various officials as having anywhere between a 75 and 95 percent 
success rate based on statistics from their 2012 clash with Hamas.87 While Israel already 
has a capability in place, some of the rockets launched still made it through their system 
and while 95 percent is a high number, the system can still be improved upon. That said, 
the United States has committed to assisting the Israeli’s defense at least by setting aside 
funding for the expansion of their Iron Dome missile defense system. The IAF’s air 
defense layout was initially equipped with two batteries funded by Israel, and was later 
upgraded to an additional two batteries that were funded by the US (so far, the US has 
funded construction for four Iron Dome batteries).88 The US Congress recently began the 
process to approve an additional grant of $600 million to fund four supplementary 
batteries and a substantial quantity of interception missiles.89 Under the assumption that 
the special budget will be approved, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is preparing to 
operate a total of ten Iron Dome batteries throughout the country. However, according to 
IDF scenarios, they require thirteen to fourteen Iron Dome batteries to protect IAF bases, 
strategic infrastructure sites, and central cities in southern and northern Israel.90 There are 
currently no plans to field that many units and thus, a part of the country is still left 
vulnerable.  
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If the United States were to further augment missile defense capabilities with 
more Iron Dome units or with United States assets in the region to protect Israel 
completely, this would likely have an influence on their decision-making. For example, if 
Israel feels protected from an Iranian-based nuclear missile based on the defense 
capabilities available, they may feel that the need to make a first strike is much less and 
can wait until Iran makes the first move. This would prevent the international community 
from condemning their actions while still assuring their existence is not put in jeopardy 
by the mere existence of an Iranian weapon. Thus, if the international community felt as 
though Israel were completely protected by missile defense, node #3.3 would inhibit 
support for a strike if that statement was true and would slightly promote if false with the 
idea that the international community would look at them as more vulnerable (and thus 
with more of a right to strike) if those capabilities were not given by the United States. 
8. United States Supports an Attack 
Support from the United States is a crucial point with the decision to attack, not 
just from the possibility of the U.S. actually providing military hardware but also from a 
political standpoint. Israel Defense Minister Barak indicated that Israel must have overt 
or at least tacit support from America for carrying out an attack.91 Public opinion is also 
tied in very closely with support from the United States and shifts drastically depending 
on the support received as was addressed in the domestic section. That said, while Israel 
looks to the United States for support, non-support does not necessarily mean a strike it 
out of the question. According to multiple sources, Israeli leaders have not been satisfied 
with U.S. responses to their attempts to obtain assurances that the United States would 
use force against Iran if non-military measures are deemed insufficient.92 These sources 
also noted that while Israel has asked Obama for assurances, Defense Minister Barak also 
said that if sanctions fail, he would use force against Iran.93 Obama’s refusal to provide 
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that assurance has helped shape Israel’s posture, which is a refusal to promise restraint on 
Israel’s part or even to give the United States advance notice of an attack if some type of 
support is not made by the Obama Administration.94 As a result, while statement #3.4 
being true would clearly promote the statement that there is international support, a lack 
of United States support would not inhibit as much as one may think based on these types 
of statements being made. While U.S. support is highly desirable, it is not a hard 
requirement for the Israelis to take action. 
9. United States Support for Israel Declines 
While overt or tacit support from the United States would signal a strong 
promoting sentiment for the Israelis to take action, a lack of support does not necessarily 
inhibit action based on statements from the previous section. However, it is worth 
considering what a decline in support, a condemnation of action, or less support in light 
of more pressing issues on the American agenda would mean for the decision-making 
process. It has been largely assessed that the relationship between the Obama 
Administration and Israeli leadership has been tense and with less manifested support in 
comparison to previous U.S. administrations.95 Additionally, prospective Secretary of 
Defense Senator Chuck Hagel has made comments over his career that have been 
considered by some as anti-Israeli, or at least cavalier, regarding complicated issues in 
the Middle East, lending to a possible perception of a less supportive Executive branch.96 
While the impact of the executive leadership and those holding the presidential cabinet 
positions may not explicitly change the official political course that the United States 
takes with Israel, it may cause Israeli decision-makers to trust the support of the United 
States less. Thus, as a general assessment of the U.S. administration is made, this may 
have a slight impact on how the international support piece is weighed. If more of the 
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executive leadership were assessed as having wavering support towards Israeli policy, it 
could easily be said that there is less overall international support, which is why there is a 
slight inhibiting link strength for #3.5. 
Additionally, domestic issues unrelated to the Israel/Iran crisis internally or 
abroad (e.g., a conflict with China) may focus the country and the administration on 
concerns that may affect how much attention is given to the Israelis. If they perceive that 
the United States must concentrate efforts elsewhere, there would be an incidental lack of 
support by necessity and this would have the same inhibiting effect on international 
support. If either of those prospects are false, though, there will be no impact as the status 
quo stance on Israel (overall U.S. support) will be assumed.  
C. REGIONAL 
In the twenty-first century thus far, the Middle East experienced a time period of 
ever-increasing tensions and transformation as the regional populace became discontent 
with many of the regimes in power.97 This was highlighted in 2010 when the Arab Spring 
began, which led to leaders being toppled, civil uprisings, and protests in more than 
fifteen Middle East states.98 As regional governments were overthrown in regions 
directly neighboring Israel, it led to a large degree of uncertainty as far as the end-state 
and how the balance of power would settle with regard to new leadership and largely new 
shifts in governance. These factors will largely affect the relationships with neighboring 
states, especially those countries directly bordering Israel like Egypt, where the Muslim 
Brotherhood has assumed some degree of power following former Egyptian leader 
Mubarak. Factors on the Iranian end of the spectrum will also impact regional affairs as 
they interact with those in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The nodes in this section 
will account for those factors along with regional military cooperation and the nearby 
conflict with the region of Palestine as they relate to the Israeli decision to take action. 
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Ref # Regional Level Three Node Impact to Level 
Two if True 
Impact to 
Level Two if 
False 
4.1 Regional countries unite and 
ally themselves publicly 
with Iran 
Inhibits (-0.7) Slightly 
Promotes 
(+0.2) 





4.3 Israel has freedom to use 
regional airspace as a strike 
route to Iran 
Promotes (+0.4) Slightly 
Inhibits (-0.2) 
4.4 Iran internal affairs 
discourage an Israeli strike 
Inhibits (-0.5) No Impact 
Table 4.   Regional Level Three Nodes and Link Strengths. 
1. Regional Countries Ally Publicly with Iran 
Based on alliances in the region with both Israel and Iran, sentiments from nearby 
countries will play a role in the decision-making process of Israel. If countries remain 
neutral or support Israel, it will not have as much of an effect as if a country 
unequivocally supports Iran in the conflict. Overt support of Iran will lead Israel to 
question the strength of a retaliation effort with prospective assistance from those states 
and the consequences of a larger isolation in the region after a strike. It generally assessed 
that overall regional reactions to a preemptive strike would be negative, further inflaming 
anti-Israel sentiment that is already present to some degree in nearby Arab nations.99 Any 
prospect of shared anti-Iranian sentiment forging a relatively discreet common cause 
between Israel and Arab Persian Gulf states or Israel and Turkey would dissipate in the 
face of a strike.100 
While Iran has been losing ground with Arab populations that are disillusioned 
with its repression at home and its support for President Assad's brutal repression in 
Syria, an Israeli strike could allow Iran to bounce back as it plays the victim and fuels 
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popular hatred toward Israel.101 Likewise, Israel’s relationship with key neighbors Egypt 
and Jordan, more bound to popular sentiment in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, 
could be severely strained, putting at risk vital peace treaties.102 This is amplified as Iran 
reaches out to Egypt to strengthen diplomatic ties following the overthrow of Mubarak. 
Egyptian President Morsi’s visit to Iran in 2012 prompted a wave of speculation 
regarding the reestablishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries.103 In an 
interview published in late 2012, around the time of the visit, Iranian Foreign Minister 
Salehi said that Tehran was eager to establish relations of “friendship and brotherhood” 
with Cairo, elaborating that Tehran hoped to restore “normal” relations with Egypt.104 
While the merits of these statements or the likelihood of whether or not Egypt would go 
through with such a move are up for debate, the fact still remains that if they did decide 
to exchange ambassadors and reinitiate ties, Israeli relations would be in jeopardy. 
Having any alliance between an Israeli-bordering nation would only dissuade Israel from 
acting, given the increased chance that defense from retaliation would be made much 
more arduous with an Iranian partner in such close proximity. 
On the other hand, while there may be shifts in some countries after the Arab 
Spring, other nations will not be allying themselves with Iran any time soon. Thus, 
information feeding into this node will be split up by country for parent nodes in level 
four of the model. For example, while the situation with Egypt changes, a country like 
Saudi Arabia takes a completely different stance on relations. One message from the 
leadership of Saudi Arabia repeatedly asked the United States to “cut off the head of the 
snake”—presumably meaning to attack Iran’s nuclear program—while there was still 
time, and another went as far to warn that if Iran is not stopped, gulf Arab states would 
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develop their own nuclear weapons. 105 As a result, it can be said that Israel won’t face 
complete opposition to a strike, but the dynamics within the region are complicated, and 
the pull of each nation will need to be carefully weighed as it is fed into the model. 
Israel has never been fully integrated into the Middle East, but on the diametric 
end they have also never faced complete isolation from regional states, which will require 
staunch support abroad in the face of such a prospect. In the past, when Israel has 
confronted Arab nationalist adversaries in the past (Egypt and Iraq), it had the non-Arab 
periphery to turn to (Iran and Turkey), and when Israel perceived a rising threat from 
Iran, it turned to peacemaking with its Arab neighbors.106 Israel has not faced a strategic 
situation in which it is isolated from Arabs and non-Arabs alike, while at the same time 
facing growing isolation on an international scale. Thus, the more countries that align 
themselves with Iran, the more it will affect node #4.1. That will strongly inhibit the 
strength of any regional support (and ultimately a strike) based on the number of nations 
that come forward to take a stance on the situation over time. 
2. Palestinian Peace Process Deteriorates 
At the time of this writing, there is little expectation of significant movement on 
either side of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Despite paying lip service to the principle of 
two states for two people, Netanyahu has done almost nothing to advance it as a 
reality.107 In fact, accelerated settlement expansion has come very close to killing off the 
two-state solution for good, say many diplomats.108 The next move on either side will 
depend heavily on how the new parliament acts towards the situation. The Jewish Home 
political party, expected to be the third biggest party in the parliament, has called for the 
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annexation of large swaths of the West Bank and flatly opposes a Palestinian state.109 
The Hatnuah Party is the only potential coalition partner that has advocated meaningful 
negotiations on a permanent two-state solution.110 While any absence of action or 
positive action towards peace may not affect the likelihood of a strike, deterioration on 
the other hand would mean bracing for immediate conflict between the two populations. 
This would undoubtedly divert valuable defense resources in an effort to concentrate the 
use of force regionally towards the Palestinian crisis. This, if this is true for node #4.2, 
the deviation from the status quo would reduce readiness and make regional conditions 
less likely to support a strike. However, the action is only slightly inhibiting as the 
Iranian surrogate Hamas, which may also inflame the Iranian issue further, may largely 
influence actions coming from within the Gaza Strip.  
3. Israel Has Freedom to Use Regional Airspace as a Strike Route 
The distance from Israel to Iran poses a significant difficulty in terms of access to 
airspace that is needed for a successful operation. Depending on the route selected, Israeli 
aircraft would have to cross the sovereign airspace of some combination of Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, Iraq, Syria, or Turkey on both legs of the trip (see Figure 8). According to one 
report, the route over Iraq would be the most direct and likely, because Iraq effectively 
has no air defenses and the United States, after its withdrawal, no longer has the 
obligation to defend Iraqi skies.111 Thus, if Israel is able to bypass Syrian airspace, 
whether by transiting surreptitiously as they did with the 2007 raid on the suspected 
Syrian nuclear site near Deir al Zur, or due to rebels overthrowing the Syrian regime (or 
at least air defense facilities), the combined Syria-Iraq route may work. While Israel can 
travel through Iraq by going through Jordan instead of Syria, this route is less likely to 
work. Jordanian officials have been largely supportive of Iran’s right to develop a 
peaceful nuclear program and Jordan’s King Abdullah II has publicly opposed any 
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military strike against Iran, advocating a diplomatic solution to the conflict instead.112 
Thus, this route is less likely if the IDF believes they can bypass Syrian airspace. A third 
option would be down through the Gulf of Aqaba over Saudi Arabia and then either Iraq 
of Kuwait. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has publicly questioned the peaceful nature of 
Iran’s nuclear enrichment program and their overall opposition to Iran’s nuclear program 
has generated speculation that the country might endorse military action against Iran 
should diplomatic approaches fail.113 There have even been reports that have suggested 
that that Saudi Arabia had already granted permission for Israel to overfly its territory for 
a strike if needed at one point and even conducted drills to ensure air defense systems 
weren’t active during such an overflight.114 A final route may involve Turkey, however 
they are also unlikely to allow use of their airspace, as it may constitute a Turkey-Israel 
conspiracy to strike, which could have other negative political implications.115 While any 
route comes with some operational or political risk, Israel may always choose to 
disregard permissions and may attempt to utilize foreign airspace without getting 
permission. They may also try to skirt the borders of two countries as they make their 
way back and forth, meaning that even if they don’t have explicit permission to use a 
route, it is less inhibiting on node #4.3 than it is promoting if they have explicit or tacit 
permission from any one country. Either way, access to airspace will be a regional 
consideration that needs to be accounted for before any type of strike can be planned and 
executed. 
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Figure 8.  Map of Potential Israeli Strike Routes. From [64]. 
4. Iran Internal Actions Discourage a Strike 
The Islamic Republic of Iran and other such regimes, which base their survival on 
fear tactics and intimidation, constantly face the danger of the populace gaining strength 
and revolting. The Iranian people, three-fifths of whom are younger than 30, and more 
than 30 million of whom are connected to the Internet, have shown signs in recent years 
of testing the limits of the security forces’ loyalties to the current regime.116 Protests 
post-election and the Green Movement have been clear indicators as catalysts for 
potential change and civil disobedience may be sparked at any time. Although the 
movement has lost some of its momentum over the past year, the fact remains that if it 
ever strengthened again, Iran could someday be faced with an insurrection. If there was 
an uprising, it is likely that the challenged leadership within Iran would have to shift 
focus drastically to quelling the revolt and may have to halt efforts toward their goals for 
any kind of an advanced weapon. Additionally, if it looked as though there would be a 
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complete change of power, it would be advantageous for Israel to delay any strike with 
the hope that a new regime may take a slightly different view towards the Jewish state. 
Thus, node #4.4 implies conditions present that would lead to a overall decreased threat 
towards Israel from Iran, which would certainly be an inhibiting factor towards a strike. 
D. PROVOCATION AND OTHER FACTORS 
There are a few occurrences that may sway a decision to strike that fall outside of 
the four general categories discussed. While they seem as though they could be related to 
some other categories, the nodes are actually distinct points that should be taken into 
account separately. For example, #5.3 and #5.4 (Table 5) both seem related to the nuclear 
node given that they assess capability to some degree. However, the nuclear level two 
statement is that “Iran has a nuclear weapons capability,” while the statements in this 
section assess possible post-strike implications on capability vice the actual nuclear 
capability that would bring on a strike. Since those questions needed to be accounted for, 
this section exists for other factors in involved that Israel would likely wargame as they 
evaluate courses of action. Those, among other provocative statements, are meant to 
account for other smaller factors that may feed into the overall decision to strike and will 
have a smaller impact than any of the other level two nodes discussed in this Chapter. 
 
Ref # Provocation / Other Level 
Three Node 
Impact to Level 
Two if True 
Impact to Level 
Two if False 





5.2 Iranian rhetoric towards 
international community is 




5.3 An attack is assessed to speed 
up nuclear weapons 
development within Iran 
Inhibits (-0.4) No Impact 
5.4 An attack is assessed to only 
delay production and will not 
completely stop nuclear 
weapons aspirations based on 




Table 5.   Provocation and Other Factors Level Three Nodes and Link Strengths. 
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1. Iranian Rhetoric Toward Israel Sparks Conflict 
In recent years, the Iranian leadership has frequently made anti-Semitic and anti-
Israel comments that place the regime among the foremost threats to Jews and the state of 
Israel. Iranian President Ahmadinejad has repeatedly demonized the state of Israel and 
openly calls for its destruction at every opportunity, most notoriously describing Israel as 
a "fake regime" that "must be wiped off the map.”117 While these general statements do 
not pose a specific threat or imply impending attack by Iran, they do add fuel to the fire 
in terms of the overall conflict. If Iran decides to increase propaganda against Israel or 
makes statements implying that they will actually attack once they are appropriately 
positioned from a readiness standpoint (whether nuclear or conventional), this will 
probably only increase the likelihood of action taken towards Iran. Even without crossing 
a red line, at some point the government of Israel may decide they have to defend the 
name of the country and may use the combination of statements made by the Iranian 
regime implying attack, in concert with the suspected weapons development program, as 
justification for a strike.  
Thus, if propaganda toward Israel is increased, node #5.1 accounts for a slightly 
promoting factor towards a strike. If statements are not made, this will have no impact 
since the status quo is based on statements already made and with the nuclear enrichment 
program continuing in the absence of rhetoric from Iran. 
2. Iranian Rhetoric Toward International Community Inhibits Attack 
From December 2011 to January 2012, some Iranian government officials openly 
threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if sanctions were imposed on Iran’s oil 
exports.118 While they have not attempted to do this with the sanctions put in place thus 
far, it demonstrates the idea that Iran believes they can use the Strait, a major artery of the 
global oil market, as a tool to leverage action (or inaction) on a global scale. Roughly 90 
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percent of all Arabian Gulf oil leaves the region on tankers that must pass through this 
narrow waterway opposite the Iranian coast; land pipelines would not provide sufficient 
alternative export routes if the waterway was blocked.119 Extended closure of the strait 
would remove roughly a quarter of the world’s oil from the market, causing a supply 
shock of the type not seen since the glory days of OPEC.120 There is no doubt that 
countries around the world would want to avoid the repercussions of this given the 
second and third-order effects on oil-dependent economies. If Iran made threats to close 
the Strait of Hormuz as a response to a strike by Israel, there would likely be pressure 
from abroad to pursue every other available option first in an effort to avoid such an 
economic crisis. This is addressed in node #5.2 as having a slightly inhibiting effect on 
the likelihood of taking action. The same effect would likely be present for any threats 
that Iran makes that would directly impact other nations. Whether they be threats toward 
the embassies of Israeli allies or vows to attack on a larger scale, it is likely that there 
would be pressures to avoid conflict on a worldwide scale if possible. While statements 
pointing toward these responses in light of an attack would all inhibit Israel from striking 
without exhausting all other available options, a lack of these types of statements would 
have no impact on their actions. This is another case of the status quo being represented if 
a node’s statement is false and only having a promoting/inhibiting action if true. A lack 
of these statements will not mean anything in terms of the nuclear situation that drives 
them to strike in the first place.  
3. An Attack is Assessed to Speed up Nuclear Weapons Development 
The primary reason for pursuing a kinetic strike option against Iran’s rests on the 
supposition that it would prevent Iran from obtaining a weapon that could be used to 
destroy Israel. If it were assessed that the outcome of a strike would actually result in Iran 
obtaining a weapon faster, that fact would likely change the strategy of the Israelis and 
would have an inhibiting effect that is represented in node #5.3. While it is difficult to 
predict, this is an outcome that is a very realistic scenario according to some experts on 
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the issue. Those experts argue that an airstrike on Iran's nuclear facilities could actually 
lead to Iran’s speeding up its efforts, ensuring the realization of a bomb and hastening its 
arrival.121 Such a move would certainly free officials in Tehran of many constraints in 
that they would likely expel international inspectors, which, in turn, would allow the 
government to undo hundreds of monitoring devices and safeguards, including seals on 
underground storage units.122 Often cited as a historical example is what happened after 
the attack on the Osirak reactor in 1981. Many say that Hussein had yet to decide to seek 
nuclear weapons until the humiliation of the strike, and that the strike both hardened his 
resolve and brought new life to the aspirations for a weapon.123 If Israeli leadership 
agreed that this scenario was possible, and they believed that they could not effectively 
destroy all of the nuclear facilities, this would likely inhibit their decision to strike, as it 
would go against their ultimate goals of keeping a weapon from Iran. If they did not 
believe it to be true, it would not impact the way ahead as it would not change the status 
quo path towards their reasons for a strike. 
4. An Attack Is Only Assessed to Delay Production and Not Halt It 
Completely 
While the International section (node #3.2) also addresses sanctions delaying 
production of a weapon, that node was just one example of the U.N. setting back Iranian 
progress in factors that may take place to delay a strike. Certainly other avenues exist for 
the U.N. to prevent nuclear efforts and that node was not meant to specifically address 
the implications of a delay on deciding whether or not to strike. Furthermore, this node is 
meant to specifically address the perceived effects on the Iranian program post-strike 
while the international node addresses effects that are seen pre- strike with regard to 
Iran’s readiness and desire to enrich in the face of sanctions. There is a set of experts that 
believe that while a strike would, in fact, inhibit the development of a weapon, that it 
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would only be a temporary setback in production.124 That said, the decision to strike 
would be more likely if it was assessed to completely destroy the program vice only 
delaying it. Israeli officials have said that a delay as opposed to full destruction of the 
program would not preclude a strike altogether in their decision so this node merely 
accounts for the impact of that outlook.125 Thus, there is a slight inhibiting potential if it 
only delays production and a promoting potential if it is assessed that an attack would 
completely destroy their nuclear program. 
E. ROOT NODE 
Up to this point in the chapter, all link strength explanations have been to explain 
and support level three nodes and their respective link strengths that feed into the primary 
categories under the root statement. However, link strengths also need to be assigned to 
each of the more general level two statements with regard to impact on the root 
statement. Assigning these link strengths is much more difficult, given that they are 
general categories and not specific items that can be researched individually for 
supporting references. Thus, the explanations for each of the level two node link 
strengths as parents to the root are based primarily on a qualitative assessment of research 
factors thus far to populate the lower level nodes. While this may seem unacceptable at 
first glance, since everything below level two is well supported, there are two 
justifications for assigning link values in this manner for the highest level below the root: 
one being fewer nodes at the top and the other being the likelihood for excursions at this 
point in the model.  
The first goes back to the reason SIAM is used in the first place to assist with this 
problem; aggregating links between seemingly unrelated items is incredibly difficult when 
there are over fifty nodes to consider in the evaluation. However, by making the majority of 
those factors parents to the level two nodes, the problem is much simplified when we only have 
to compare the five general factors and how they impact the root. Aside from only dealing with 
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a few factors, there are no cross-links above level three in the model so it is just a matter of 
stepping back to look at how each would impact with some reference to the other factors. For 
example, if Iran has a nuclear capability, it can easily be said that the impact of that factor is 
both significant on its own, and more significant, than say, the regional factors involved (when 
put side by side). Thus, while each link is supposed to be accounted for individually, there is 
some reference to other nodes at this level just to ensure a similar scale is being used when 
assessing the promoting or inhibiting potential of each node.  
The second justification for doing level two in this manner is the fact that, since these 
are largely qualitative statements, they are much more open to debate by subject matter experts. 
This is where the excursion features of SIAM can be implemented and it would likely only be 
done with a higher-level link if there were not time to dig through each node of the entire 
model. While a general assessment and baseline link strength will be made, it is much more 
likely that SMEs will argue over how important each general category is and thus multiple 
higher-level excursions can be conducted for their own view points. Those can then be 
aggregated for comparison and left to a high-level decision-maker on whose judgment he or 
she trusts to assign the values. With that in mind, the baseline link strengths used are below for 
level two along with brief notes on the qualitative factors that lead to the assignment of each 
category’s link strength. 
 
Ref # Level Two Nodes Impact to Root if True Impact Root if False 
1.0 Iran has a nuclear 
weapons capability 








Promotes (+0.5) Inhibits (-0.5) 
4.0 Regional conditions 
support a strike 
Promotes (+0.5) Slightly Inhibits (-0.5) 
5.0 Provocation / other 
factors support a 
strike 
Slightly Promotes (+0.2) No Impact 
Table 6.   Root Node Level Two Factors and Link Strengths. 
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1. Nuclear 
The basis of Israel’s action towards Iran is preventing Iran from getting weapons 
that could be used against Israel to, as President Ahmadinejad put it, would “wipe them 
off the map.”126 This, in conjunction with statements from Israel about red lines with 
Iranian enrichment efforts, makes the nuclear capability of Iran the primary driver 
towards Israel conducting a strike against Iran. Thus, node #1.0 is assessed to have the 
largest promoting/inhibiting potential depending on whether the capability is there or not. 
Absent a nuclear capability, justification for a strike would be very difficult in the eyes of 
the world and may completely isolate Israel if action is taken without some evidence of 
perceived hostilities from Iran. 
2. Domestic 
If Iran is assessed to have a nuclear capability, Israel’s domestic ability to conduct 
an effective strike that is supported by both the government and the people is the next 
largest factor after Iranian nuclear capabilities. It is plausible that if Israel felt as though 
they were faced with an existential threat, that they would attempt a strike even if they 
could not guarantee success from a domestic readiness standpoint. That said, a strike may 
occur despite this node not reflecting full support and this is the justification for the 
promoting/inhibiting strength of domestic nodes being slightly less than the nuclear level 
two node. That said, aside from the existential threat, the domestic ability to strike and 
surrounding support from within Israel is the second strongest factor in deciding whether 
or not the Israelis should strike. Aside from an existential threat, there would not likely be 
a reason to strike if they did not believe it could be supported from a domestic readiness 
standpoint. This is because there would be time to either improve readiness or wait out 
the status of the Iranian nuclear program based on other factors. 
3. Regional and International 
While regional and international factors will have a large impact on the decision 
to take action, they are less important factors overall when compared to the nuclear and 
domestic nodes. This is simply because if there is a nuclear capability from Iran and 
                                                
126 Anti-Defamation League, “Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in his Own Words.” 
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Israel has the ability to eliminate that threat based on domestic readiness (military 
capability and government/public support), it can be said that conditions support a strike 
based on the statements outlined from Israeli leadership. However, up until the point that 
both the domestic and nuclear nodes show up completely true, there is quite a bit of 
uncertainty with the problem; this is what the model aims to assist with in the first place 
as it looks at the whole range factors leading up to a decision to strike. While Israel may 
not be fully capable of supporting from a domestic standpoint, or while Iranian 
capabilities may only be suspected to some degree, the other two factors may make or 
break the decision to go forward with kinetic action. For example, support from the 
United States will play a large role in the overall decision, which falls in the international 
node, or the availability to obtain a suitable strike route from the regional node both play 
large factors contributing to domestic readiness. While both of those factors fall under 
other nodes, respectively, many of their parent factors will be cross-linked with the 
nuclear and domestic nodes, highlighting their importance and still influencing across the 
model. Thus, both international and regional factors overall are listed as either promoting 
or inhibiting at equal weights depending on their factors. While the strength levels are 
below those of the hard factors that are the nuclear and domestic nodes, they still have a 
significant ability to influence the decisions and are treated as such based on assigned 
strengths. These are certainly two nodes where SMEs may disagree to some degree about 
the link strengths and where excursions will be likely as they may place slightly more 
strength with either category. 
4. Provocation/Other 
Finally, the provocation / other category is meant to account for other smaller 
factors that may tip the scales marginally as far as smaller decisions that come into play 
and as Israel wargames their courses of action. These factors, if true, only slightly 
promote the decision to strike as most are soft factors surrounding Iranian rhetoric or 
post-strike outcomes. If they are false, however, there will be no impact to the root level 
based on the nature of the statements in the nodes and the fact that they are either based 
on rhetoric that may not be present at all to inflame the situation or assessments that may 
not necessarily happen to impact the decision at all. 
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V. MODEL OUTPUT AND ASSESSMENTS 
A. INITIAL MODEL OUTPUT (BELIEF EVALUATION) 
Belief evaluation is the process of mathematically updating the current belief of 
every node in the model based on user inputs. In essence, this is the process used to run 
and re-run the model based on adjustments to each initial node. The initial run of the 
model was done using open-source information and a qualitative assessment of the 
certainty of each of the 70 initial nodes in the model. The high-level graphical depiction 
of the model is depicted in Figure 9 with the results at the Root Level shown in Figure 
10. Overall, based on the first run of the model, it yielded a 43% belief that current 
conditions support a preemptive strike on Iran. To note, the model looks at 50% as 
unknown, with anything below that level to yield a false forecast and anything above 
resulting in a calculation of true. Thus, the statement that Israel will conduct a strike 
based on current factors with default excursion link strengths is false. 
Multiple excursions can be run to adjust link strengths with comparison of the 
output to gauge how different weights may affect the outputs. Instead of running multiple 
scenarios, however, it is better to look at other assessments that SIAM gives based on the 
current link strengths to see how those may glean information useful in to a high-level 
decision-maker. Those assessments and their results are reflected below. Conclusions and 
analysis based on the results of those assessments are addressed in Chapter VI. 
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Figure 9.  Initial Belief Evaluation Overview.127 
 
Figure 10.  Root Level View of Initial Belief Evaluation. 
                                                
127Assessment of statements is color-based. Yellow indicates unknown, green indicates true, and red 
indicates false. Shading indicates degrees of certainty so faded red or green indicate statements closer to 
unknown while more solid colors indicate more strength in the statement as true or false. 
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B. MODEL ASSESSMENTS 
Impact analysis and sensitivity analysis allow one to extract information about 
individual nodes that may have a significant impact on the overall model. As described 
earlier, one of the problems with looking at such a broad problem is isolating factors that 
may impact the problem, especially those that are not especially obvious at first glance. 
Certain factors, for example, like Iran getting a nuclear capability certainly don’t require 
a model to inform a decision-maker that the likelihood will be high that Israel considers a 
strike. The model is not intended yield this type of information. Rather, smaller factors 
may be concentrated on with assessments that would not normally be looked at or 
obvious as a route to push policy for guiding the problem or forecasting what direction 
the conflict is headed in as a briefing tool.  
1. Impact Analysis 
The impact analysis technique can be performed on any user-selected effect node 
within the model. The immediate influencing events are assessed to determine their 
relative influencing impact on the selected node. The impact of each parent on the 
selected node is determined from the user-assigned link strengths of the parent-child link. 
The intent of impact analysis is to identify which direct cause (parent) holds the greatest 
influence over the desired effect (child).128 While impact analysis is important towards 
forecasting, it is arguably the less important of the two assessments that can be 
performed. What will yield more results from a decision-maker’s perspective is 
sensitivity analysis, which is dealt with in the next section. Impact analysis results for 
each category are shown in Figures 11-16, with the root node being first and then the 
impact analysis on each of the general categories. 
                                                
128 Science Applications International Corporation, “Situational Influence Assessment Module User’s 




Figure 11.  Root Node Impact Analysis. 
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Figure 12.  Nuclear Node Impact Analysis. 
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Figure 13.  Domestic Node Impact Analysis. 
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Figure 14.  International Node Impact Analysis. 
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Figure 15.  Regional Node Impact Analysis. 
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Figure 16.  Provocation/Other Node Impact Analysis. 
2. Sensitivity Analysis 
In addition to impact analysis, SIAM also provides a set of sensitivity analysis 
methods that examine the potential to change the likelihood of a desired event’s 
occurrence. Unlike impact analysis, sensitivity analysis considers both immediate cause–
effect relationships and distant influences that may consist of multiple influencing 
chains.129 
                                                
129 Ibid. 
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a. Pressure Parents 
Pressure Parents Analysis considers the potential for change in the user-
selected event that is generated by the immediate causes of the selected event, i.e., the 
selected event’s parent nodes in the same Influence Net. Pressure parent analysis for each 
node sorted by sensitivity, promoting potential, and inhibiting potential, is shown in 
Figures 17-34. The first three apply to the root node and the remaining figures are for 
each level two category. 
 
Figure 17.  Root Node Pressure Parent Sensitivity Assessment. 
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Figure 18.  Root Node Pressure Parent Promoting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 19.  Root Node Pressure Parent Inhibiting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 20.  Nuclear Node Pressure Parent Sensitivity Assessment. 
 74 
 
Figure 21.  Nuclear Node Pressure Parent Promoting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 22.  Nuclear Node Pressure Parent Inhibiting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 23.  Domestic Node Pressure Parent Sensitivity Assessment. 
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Figure 24.  Domestic Node Pressure Parent Promoting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 25.  Domestic Node Pressure Parent Inhibiting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 26.  International Node Pressure Parent Sensitivity Assessment. 
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Figure 27.  International Node Pressure Parent Promoting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 28.  International Node Pressure Parent Inhibiting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 29.  Regional Node Pressure Parent Sensitivity Assessment. 
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Figure 30.  Regional Node Pressure Parent Promoting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 31.  Regional Node Pressure Parent Inhibiting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 32.  Provocation/Other Node Pressure Parent Sensitivity Assessment. 
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Figure 33.  Provocation/Other Node Pressure Parent Promoting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 34.  Provocation/Other Node Pressure Parent Inhibiting Potential Assessment. 
b. Pressure Points 
Pressure points analysis considers the potential for change in the user-
selected event that is generated by the initial nodes, which are connected to the selected 
node via one or more influencing chains. Pressure point analysis, sorted by sensitivity, 
promoting potential, and inhibiting potential is shown in Figures 35–52. The first three 
figures show the pressure points for the root nodes, while the remaining figures address 
each of the categories. 
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Figure 35.  Root Node Pressure Points Sensitivity Analysis. 
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Figure 36.  Root Node Pressure Points Promoting Potential Analysis. 
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Figure 37.  Root Node Pressure Points Inhibiting Potential Analysis. 
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Figure 38.  Nuclear Node Pressure Points Sensitivity Assessment. 
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Figure 39.  Nuclear Node Pressure Points Promoting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 40.  Nuclear Node Pressure Points Inhibiting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 41.  Domestic Node Pressure Points Sensitivity Assessment. 
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Figure 42.  Domestic Node Pressure Points Promoting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 43.  Domestic Node Pressure Points Inhibiting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 44.  International Node Pressure Points Sensitivity Assessment. 
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Figure 45.  International Node Pressure Points Promoting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 46.  International Node Pressure Points Inhibiting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 47.  Regional Node Pressure Points Sensitivity Assessment. 
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Figure 48.  Regional Node Pressure Points Promoting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 49.  Regional Node Pressure Points Inhibiting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 50.  Provocative/Other Node Pressure Points Sensitivity Assessment. 
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Figure 51.  Provocation/Other Node Pressure Points Promoting Potential Assessment. 
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Figure 52.  Provocation/Other Node Pressure Points Inhibiting Potential Assessment. 
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3. Potential Excursions 
The idea of true excursions in the model would involve changing link strengths to 
see how they affect outcomes. This would likely involve SME’s who have differing 
opinions on one aspect of the model while all the impact statements remain the same. 
Since the first version of the model was created to assess a software solution to aid in 
decision-making, those kinds of changes will not be addressed in the thesis. Rather, the 
pseudo-excursions will be done to gauge the effects that changes in belief analysis may 
yield to see how the overall impact to the model changes. That is to say, based on the 
sensitivity analysis, for example, if the U.S. were to take action that prevented the Israeli 
Prime Minister from supporting a strike, what would the outcome be? Those types of 
what-ifs will be addressed in the next Chapter as the assessments are analyzed to generate 
plans of action. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this work was to produce a software model that was capable of 
estimating the impact of a wide range of factors to forecast the likelihood of conflict 
between two states. More importantly, the goal was also to assess both the efficacy of 
such a model as an aid to a decision-maker by being both a situational awareness tool and 
an instrument to assist with potential policy-making recommendations. The product was a 
significant step towards that goal and a substantial amount of data can be extracted to 
judge the success of the model in meeting those aims, especially with the use of the built-
in SIAM assessment tools. 
1. Analysis as a Decision-Making Tool 
In evaluating this type of model as a decision-making tool, a leader will likely 
want to use the model to influence a situation or elicit a specific response based on a 
desired end-state. Commander’s intent is key to use the model in this way, and while 
there is no step-by-step methodology in place to utilize the SIAM tools in this manner, 
the assessment functions can be used in somewhat of a systematic factor to decide which 
nodes to target with strategic decisions. 
For example, assume the intent was to prevent an Israeli preemptive strike based 
on the beliefs by U.S. leadership that a strike would largely destabilize the region. The 
first step would be to look at the impact analysis to narrow down the most impactful 
branches of the model. Iran’s nuclear capabilities and domestic factors account for a 
combined 50% of the impact on the root statement per the impact analysis tool. 
Essentially, those two factors have the ability to swing the outcome of the root statement 
completely if the parent nodes underneath both were completely true or false. By 
concentrating on those categories, one can pinpoint nodes within those branches that have 
the most pressure on the statements from the parents to the children. This is where the 
sensitivity analysis comes into play. In this case, we are looking to prevent conflict (make 
the root statement false), so the inhibiting potential of nodes under the dominant 
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categories would be the most likely places to concentrate. Additionally, the most 
sensitive under the root node overall should be taken into account. In doing this, one 
should not just look for those are most sensitive, but also those that can potentially be 
controlled by the decision-maker. For example, while IAEA reports were listed near the 
top of potentially inhibiting statements, those wouldn’t be areas that a COCOM or the 
U.S. State Department could control through policy or through other pressures. By 
evaluating the primary inhibiting factors, there are a few that were identified as 
potentially controllable: Support from the Israeli Prime Minister and air tanking abilities 
on the domestic side, and Iran’s ability to enrich coupled with covert methods deemed to 
make their nuclear programs less effective on the nuclear side.  
With these in mind, one could use a multi-pronged IO campaign to affect all of 
those areas by also evaluating cross-linked factors that impact the controllable nodes. On 
the domestic side, a military information support operation (MISO) campaign could be 
directed towards the Israeli public highlighting a lack of U.S. support (whether true or 
not) as there was assessed to be a link between public opinion and action from the 
governing body of Israel, which would influence the Prime Minister. That, in conjunction 
with Department of State dialog with the Israeli PM outlining reservations about a strike 
and withholding U.S. air tanking support for any number of reasons could impact the 
pinpointed domestic nodes. On the nuclear side, a computer network operations (CNO) 
campaign could be waged to attempt another disruption in centrifuge SCADA systems as 
was done with Stuxnet. The rationale that covert CNO campaigns were in play could also 
be an influence tool with the Israeli Prime Minister to promote deferring a strike. 
Assuming those factors are successfully influenced, when the beliefs are adjusted 
in the model to reflect the potential changes and evaluated again, the likelihood of a strike 
goes down to 33% from 43%. On the other hand, if the U.S. wanted the exact opposite 
outcome and advocated a strike (with a MISO campaign pushed in support, tanking 
assistance, and no CNO campaign in place to allow the continued enrichment of uranium 
at the current rate), the likelihood of a strike goes up to 56%. Thus, assuming SME 
concurrence with the link strengths as a method of verification with the structure of the 
overall model, it appears that by pinpointing and attempting to influence key controllable 
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nodes that are deemed promoting or inhibiting, the forecast outcome of the root statement 
can be drastically swayed. In this case, it goes from a three in ten chance of a strike (with 
the model indicating no strike) up to more than one in two chance that a strike and a an 
indication that a strike is more likely occur based solely on somewhat controllable factors 
that a higher-level policy maker could direct action towards. 
A model of this sort can successfully be used to isolate factors that would be 
useful in shaping the outcome of a conflict, especially in the IO realm where there are so 
many non-kinetic factors used in pre-crisis management that may affect an outcome. 
Additionally, wargaming can be done as different assumptions are made about link 
strengths or to assess what different COAs may look like with iterations of belief 
evaluations as decision-makers pose conditional scenarios. Thus, the model is assessed as 
being able to successfully model a conflict of this type and for use as a decision-making 
tool towards shaping a conflict. Furthermore, as more factors are realized, they can easily 
be incorporated into the model with new belief evaluations being done instantly, giving 
an IO or intelligence cell another useful tool in tracking a larger conflict.  
2. Analysis as a Situational Awareness Tool 
One key consideration in using this type of model is the fact that it does not 
account for changes over time. Therefore, its use as a situational awareness tool may be 
questioned initially. It must be updated over time to reflect current beliefs and baseline 
values will be constantly changing. Once the model is created and SMEs agree on the 
link strengths, however, it becomes a tool that can be very easily updated by intelligence 
analysts on a watch-by-watch or daily basis. One of the fundamental data points the 
model yields after beliefs are calculated are quantitative outputs for each node. Most 
important of these of course is the number generated for the root statement. For example, 
when this model was first run, it gave a 43% likelihood that Israel would execute a 
preemptive strike on Iran given current assumptions and inputs, pointing to a false 
likelihood overall that action would be taken. Without showing the entire model or even 
the top two levels, a number like this can be tracked from day to day and trend analysis 
can be done. Developments in a situation can be tracked with percentage increases on a 
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briefing board and statistics similar to stock trackers can be kept, showing 52-week highs 
and lows, percentage changes, and graphs over time. Trip wires can be in place as 
commander’s critical information requirements when the output goes over a certain level 
even and the process can easily be tracked with an excel spreadsheet. 
As similar models are applied to other conflicts over longer periods, data over 
years may also glean key information about trends around annual events that may 
correspond to events that were not previously recognized as factors in the model. Thus, it 
appears that a SIAM model can be very useful in tracking the status of a conflict over 
time even if the model itself does not account for the passing of time. It is clear that a 
SIAM model can be used as both an effective briefing tool and a decision-making tool to 
assess problems surrounding conflict between two states. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While a model of this fashion can be used successfully gauge the status of a 
conflict and to assist with high-level decision-making, this thesis did not evaluate its use 
by an intelligence or IO cell. Thus, usability in a real-world setting still needs to be tested 
in terms of manageability and in setting protocols for belief input and querying SMEs for 
link strength. A logical next step would be to expand the model on a number of levels, 
both with the nodes of the model itself and with the verification process for certain links 
and nodes. Notionally, each node could be assigned an SME that an intelligence analyst 
could consult if the one believed that link strengths needed to change. Seeking out and 
recording those personnel within the model would be a challenging project, but would 
validate the model and provide for accountability for sources if it were used as a more 
operational briefing tool. Furthermore, the model can be further expanded and more 
parent nodes generated to make input factors more detailed. The more nodes that are 
present, the better the product will be and the more likely that there will be more 
accuracy with the quantitative nature of the output. 
Additionally, while the model generated for this thesis was based specifically on 
Israel conducting a strike against Iran, many factors present between the two nations in 
terms of provocation and domestic factors would be common to any two states that may 
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find themselves in conflict with each other. Thus expanding the model towards a general 
framework that can be applied towards other states would be a recommended avenue 
towards follow-on research. To narrow the scope of expanding towards a general model, 
this type on conflict model could be added to CONPLANs or OPLANs as part of the 
package to be used for Phase 0 or Phase 1 operations. It is certainly a useful tool to 
evaluate the effects that strategic and operational decisions may have on any number of 
situations. 
Finally, once a general framework was validated, the data and calculations could 
be coded into a GUI interface and software package that was built specifically with 
intelligence cells in mind. This would take out the learning curve towards using the 
modeling software and would allow for easy inputs and adjustments to a preset model 
that was determined not to change in its basic structure. Modeling tools like this aim to 
simplify complicate projects and their use in the future will be invaluable to have in place 
as decision-making cycles speed up with the ever-increasing pace of warfare today. 
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A. LIST OF INITIAL NODE STATEMENTS 
Below are the initial statements that need to be addressed to act as parent nodes to 
all the children above. All statements need to be assessed as true/false, to which degrees 
of certainty to the statement can be with the slider bars that were described in Chapter I. 
The respective level two category for each statement is listed in parentheses. 
• Iran is able to enrich uranium internally. 
• Israel assesses Iran as having crossed the red line in production. 
• Iran outsources uranium enrichment to Russia or France or is able to 
obtain those materials through agreements with other countries. 
• Weapons from the black market have been delivered. 
• Parts to make weapons components have been delivered to Iran. 
• Intelligence indicates Iran is building weapons materials. 
• Iran detonates a nuclear weapon in a test. 
• Iran conducts tests classified as small fizzles. 
• Iran’s command and control structure is adjusted to stand up a strategic 
nuclear command. 
• Covert sites related to nuclear activities are discovered. 
• Iran has a nuclear weapons air delivery platform capability. 
• Iran has a nuclear weapon missile delivery capability. 
• Iran has a nuclear weapon ground delivery capability. 
• Covert methods (sabotage, cyber warfare, assassination) are assessed to be 
effective in hindering production efforts. 
• IAEA concludes with certainty that in-country nuclear work is being 
conducted with entirely peaceful purposes as allowed by the NPT. 
• Iran possesses a used reactor fuel reprocessing capability. 
• It is assessed that Israel can absorb a reduction of 5% of GDP for wartime 
efforts. 
• Unemployment is above 11%. 
• Doctrine and plans support attack on Iran. 
• Israel has the ability to defend against a counterattack. 
 114 
• Israel has bunker-buster munitions. 
• Israel has air-tanking capabilities. 
• Israel has adequate fighter/bomber air assets available and operational. 
• Iran has been linked to a terrorist attack against Israel. 
• Iran has been linked to a terror attack on Israel through a proxy 
organization. 
• A non-Iranian linked organization has been linked to an attack on Israel. 
• Israeli Prime Minster supports an attack on Iran. 
• Israeli President supports an attack on Iran. 
• Knesset majority supports an attack on Iran. 
• Mossad Chief supports attack on Iran 
• IDF leadership supports an attack on Iran. 
• U.N. formally supports Israeli-led strike against Iran. 
• U.S. formally supports an Israeli-led strike against Iran. 
• NATO formally supports an Israeli-led strike against Iran. 
• Russia increases support of NPT. 
• U.N. becomes more involved in Syrian conflict. 
• Trade embargo against Iran is assessed as effective. 
• U.S. supplies Israel with nuclear weapons. 
• U.S. provides Israel with additional missile defense hardware to shield 
entire country. 
• U.S. increases ballistic missile defense assets in the region. 
• U.S. supplies Israel with bunker buster munitions 
• U.S. support for Israel has been formally withdrawn. 
• U.S. support for Israel has declined based on a change of cabinet-level 
U.S. leadership (or higher) and their respective views. 
• Internal U.S. distractions have shifted the political focus away from Israel. 
• External distractions have shifted U.S. political focus away from Israel. 
• The Arab League supports Iran in the conflict. 
• Egypt supports Iran in the Israel-Iran conflict. 
• Syria supports Iran in the Israel-Iran conflict. 
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• United Arab Emirates supports Iran in the Israel-Iran conflict. 
• Saudi Arabia supports Iran in the Israel-Iran conflict. 
• Iraq supports Iran in the Israel-Iran conflict. 
• Jordan supports Iran in the Israel-Iran conflict. 
• Lebanon supports Iran in the Israel-Iran conflict. 
• Pakistan supports Iran in the Israel-Iran conflict. 
• Turkey supports Iran in the Israel-Iran conflict. 
• The Palestinian peace process has deteriorated (or is deteriorating). 
• Syrian air defense has been entirely taken control of by rebel opposition. 
• Syrian dictator Al Assad and his regime are overthrown. 
• Permission is given by another regional country for overflight. 
• Iranian political unrest is assessed as leading to a regime change in the 
near future. 
• Iran makes statements implying they will conduct a nuclear strike against 
Iran upon obtaining a nuclear weapon. 
• Iran has amplified statements outlining their intentions to destroy Israel. 
• Iran overtly states or implies that if attacked, they will close the Straits of 
Hormuz. 
• Iran overtly states or implies that if attacked, they will attack Israeli allies. 
• An attack on Iran is assessed to speed up nuclear weapons production 
within the country. 
• An attack is assessed to only delay production and not to completely stop 
nuclear weapons aspirations based on current strike capabilities. 
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A. CONSOLIDATED LINK STRENGTH MATRIX 
Below is a complete list of link strengths in the model, organized by node levels 
and the by level two category. The link strengths are listed in parentheses in the same 
format used in Chapter III. Initial nodes are in gray and appear primarily in the lower 
levels. 








strike on Iran 
        




(+0.8 / -0.7) 
      







(+0.9 / -0.8) 
    





(+0.6 / -0.8) 
  
    ↳ Iran arranges to 
buy enriched 
uranium from a 
foreign source 
(+1.0 / -0.8) 
  




(+0.3 / -0.6) 
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"red line" in 
production 
(+1.0 / -0.8) 
    





(+0.7 / -0.2) 
    
    ↳ Delivery of 
weapons from 
black market 
(+0.4 / 0) 
  
    ↳ Delivery of 
parts to make 
weapons  
(+0.6 / -0.4) 
  
    ↳ Intelligence 




(+0.6 / -0.4) 
  





(+1.0 / -0.1) 
    
    ↳ Iran detonates a 
nuclear weapon 
(+1.0 / -0.2) 
  
    ↳ Iran conducts 
tests classified 
as small fizzles 
(+0.4 / -0.1) 
  





(+0.2 / -0.1) 
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    ↳ Iran's C2 
structure stands 










(+0.6 / -0.1) 
  





(+0.6 / -0.4) 
  
      ↳ Iran has air 
delivery 
capability 
(+1.0 / 0) 




(+1.0 / 0) 




(+1.0 / -0.4) 












(-0.6 / 0) 
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(-0.8 / +0.6) 
    






(+0.7 / 0) 







(+0.7 / -0.6) 
      




on Iran  
(+0.2 / -0.4) 
    




5% of GDP for 
wartime efforts 
(+0.8 / -0.6) 
  
    ↳ Unemployment 
is above 11% (-
0.4 / +0.2) 
  
  ↳ Doctrine / 
Plans support 
attack on Iran 
(+0.1 / -0.2) 
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  ↳ Israel has the 
military 
readiness 
required for a 
strike  
(0 / -0.9) 
    




(+0.5 / -0.6) 
  





(+0.8 / -0.6) 
  
      ↳ Israel has 
bunker-buster 
munitions 
(+0.6 / -0.7) 
      ↳ Israel has air 
tanking 
capabilities 
(+0.8 / -0.8) 






(+0.8 / -1.0) 





(+0.5 / 0) 
    
    ↳ Iran linked to a 
terrorist attack 
against Israel 
(+0.8 / -0.8) 
  




(+0.6 / -0.4) 
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    ↳ Non-Iran 
organization 
linked to attack 
(-0.6 / +0.2) 
  
  ↳ Public 
opinion 
supports an 
attack on Iran 
(+0.5 / -0.5) 
    
    ↳ Demonstrations 
in support of 
attack  
(+0.6 / -0.2) 
  




(+0.6 / -0.6) 
  
  ↳ Current 
Israeli govt is 
supportive of 
attack on Iran 
(+0.7 / -0.8) 
    
    ↳ Prime minister 
supports attack 
(+0.9 / -0.8) 
  
    ↳ President 
supports attack 
(+0.4 / -0.6) 
  
    ↳ Knesset 
majority 
supports attack 
(+0.6 / -0.6) 
  
    ↳ Mossad Chief 
supports Attack 
(+0.4 / -0.4) 
  
    ↳ IDF leadership 
supports attack 










(+0.5 / -0.5) 
      







(+0.4 / -0.2) 
    





(+1 / -0.6) 
  






(+0.6 / -0.4) 
  
  ↳ Intl 
organizations 
demonstrate 







(-0.6 / +0.4) 
    






(+0.4 / -0.2) 
  




(+0.2 / 0) 
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    ↳ Trade embargo 
against Iran is 
assessed as 
effective  
(+0.6 / -0.6) 
  







(-0.4 / +0.2) 
    




(+0.6 / -0.2) 
  
    ↳ U.S. provides 
missile defense 
(+0.4 / -0.4) 
  








(+0.6 / -0.6) 
      ↳ U.S. increases 
BMD assets in 
region  
(+0.6 / -0.4) 




(+0.2 / -0.2) 
  




(+0.6 / -0.4) 
    




(-0.3 / 0) 
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    ↳ Support 
formally 
withdrawn by 
the U.S.  
(+1.0 / 0) 
  
    ↳ Support 
declines based 




(+0.2 / 0) 
  
    ↳ Support 
indirectly 
declines due to 
distraction 
(+0.3 / -0.3) 
  





(+0.4 / 0) 










(+0.3 / -0.2) 
      
  ↳ Regional 
countries 




(-0.6 / +0.2) 
    
    ↳ The Arab 
League 
supports Iran in 
the conflict 
(+0.6 / -0.2) 
  
 126 
    ↳ Egypt made 
statement 
supporting Iran 
in the conflict 
(+0.5 / -0.2) 
  
    ↳ Syria made 
statement 
supporting Iran 
in the conflict 
(+0.5 / -0.2) 
  
    ↳ UAE made 
statement 
supporting Iran 
in the conflict 
(+0.5 / -0.2) 
  
    ↳ Saudi Arabia 
made statement 
supporting Iran 
in the conflict 
(+0.5 / -0.2) 
  
    ↳ Iraq made 
statement 
supporting Iran 
in the conflict 
(+0.5 / -0.2) 
  
    ↳ Jordan made 
statement 
supporting Iran 
in the conflict 
(+0.5 / -0.2) 
  
    ↳ Lebanon made 
statement 
supporting Iran 
in the conflict 
(+0.5 / -0.2) 
  
    ↳ Pakistan made 
statement 
supporting Iran 
in the conflict 
(+0.5 / -0.2) 
  
 127 
    ↳ Turkey made 
statement 
supporting Iran 
in the conflict 
(+0.5 / -0.2) 
  
  ↳ Palestinian 
peace process 
deteriorates 
(-0.2 / 0) 
    
  ↳ Israel has 
freedom to 
use regional 
airspace as a 
strike route 
to Iran  
(+0.4 / -0.2) 
    
    ↳ Syrian Air 
Defense 
entirely take 
control of by 
rebel 
opposition 
(+0.5 / -0.2) 
  
    ↳ Syrian Dictator 
Al Assad and 
his regime are 
overthrown 
(+0.4 / -0.2) 
  






(+1.0 / -0.6) 
  





(-0.5 / 0) 
    
    ↳ Political unrest 
leads to regime 
change  
(+0.8 / -0.6) 
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(+0.2 / -0.2) 
      




made by Iran 
(+0.2 / 0) 
    








(+0.8 / 0) 
  






(+0.6 / -0.2) 
  








(-0.3 / 0) 
    
    ↳ Iran overtly 
states or 
implies that if 
attacked, they 
will close the 
Straits of 
Hormuz  
(+0.6 / -0.2) 
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    ↳ Iran overtly 
states or 




(+0.6 / -0.4) 
  






within Iran  
(-0.3 / 0) 
    
  
↳ 












(-0.2 / +0.4) 








A. MODEL DIAGRAM 
The SIAM screenshots give a visual depiction of the model. In addition to seeing 
the model in a different way, this appendix also accounts for cross-links between nodes 
that were not given in the overview link strength matrix. The following is the model as it 
was run for Chapter V and VI outputs and assessments: 
 
Figure 53.  SIAM Model Root Node Screenshot. 
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Figure 54.  SIAM Model Nuclear Branch Screenshot. 
 
Figure 55.  SIAM Model Domestic Branch Screenshot. 
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Figure 56.  SIAM Model International Branch Screenshot. 
 
Figure 57.  SIAM Model Regional Branch Screenshot. 
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Figure 58.  SIAM Model Provocation / Other Factor Branch Screenshot. 
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